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The “Too Big to Jail” Effect and the Impact on
the Justice Department’s Corporate Charging
Policy
Court E. Golumbic and Albert D. Lichy

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the failure of the Department of Justice (“Justice
Department” or “DOJ”) to bring criminal charges against any financial institutions
prompted critics to question whether the DOJ maintained a policy that certain
corporations are “too big to jail.” The criticism piqued after the DOJ announced that it
had entered into a deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”) with HSBC to resolve a
massive money laundering and government sanctions investigation.
This wave of criticism is the backdrop for what the Authors call the “too big to jail”
effect—two related developments, each of which has the potential to impact the future of
DPAs in the corporate crime context. The first is a willingness on the part of at least one
federal district court to inject a level of judicial intervention into the process of structuring
DPAs. In approving the HSBC, Judge John Gleeson issued a groundbreaking opinion
articulating, for the first time, a standard for district court review of the terms of a DPA.
The second is an emerging willingness on the part of the DOJ to pursue criminal charges
over DPAs in high-profile cases involving financial institutions. In a strong departure from
past practice, the DOJ recently secured guilty pleas from the foreign subsidiaries of UBS
and RBS, SAC Capital Advisors and three related entities, and the parent of Credit Suisse.
This Article examines the impact of the “too big to jail” effect on the Justice Department’s
corporate charging practices. The Authors argue that DPAs should not be abandoned.
Instead, Congress should amend the Speedy Trial Act to require substantive, judicial
review of the terms of DPAs. To this end, the Authors propose a standard of review that
is designed to maximize the benefits of DPAs, while minimizing the concerns that have
historically accompanied their use.

* Court E. Golumbic is a Managing Director and the global Anti-Money Laundering, AntiBribery, and Government Sanctions Compliance Officer at a major global financial institution. He is
also a Lecturer-in-Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and a former Assistant United
States Attorney with the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York.
** Albert D. Lichy graduated from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 2011 and is one of
Court Golumbic’s former students. He will soon begin a clerkship in the chambers of the Hon. Thomas L.
Ambro of the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
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Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing economic downturn
have prompted intense scrutiny of the United States Department of
Justice’s (“Justice Department” or “DOJ”) charging practices with
1
respect to corporate defendants. Specifically, the Justice Department’s
failure to bring criminal charges against any financial institutions for
their perceived role in causing the crisis prompted members of Congress,
the press, and the public to question whether the agency has maintained
a de facto policy that certain corporations are “too big jail” given their
2
size and economic significance.
Criticism of the Justice Department’s approach piqued after its
December 12, 2012 announcement that it had entered into a deferred
3
prosecution agreement (“DPA”) with HSBC in the face of overwhelming
evidence—and HSBC’s own admission—that it enabled Mexican and
Colombian narcotics cartels to launder more than $800 million through
one if its subsidiaries, and that the bank facilitated over $660 million in
transactions involving Cuba, Iran, and other jurisdictions subject to U.S.
4
economic sanctions. Statements by a senior DOJ official suggesting that
the DOJ’s goal in negotiating the HSBC DPA was “not to bring HSBC
down, . . . not to cause a systemic effect on the economy, . . . [and] not for
5
people to lose thousands of jobs,” were met with indignation and fueled
speculation that the fear of potential collateral consequences is the
deciding factor dictating federal prosecutors’ corporate charging
6
decisions.
The Justice Department’s extension of a DPA to HSBC was not a
novel move; rather, it reflects more than a decade of practice that emerged
in response to another, earlier wave of criticism of Justice Department
charging policy—the 2003 indictment of Arthur Andersen, then a
prominent U.S. accounting firm, for its role in obstructing an investigation

1. See infra notes 143–195 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 143–195 and accompanying text.
3. A deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”) is an agreement between a prosecutor and a
defendant whereby the defendant agrees to waive indictment and consents to the filing of criminal
charges in exchange for certain undertakings on the defendant’s part. See Scott A. Resnik & Keir N.
Dougall, The Rise of Deferred Prosecution Agreements, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 18, 2006, at 1; see also infra
notes 36–38 and accompanying text. If these undertakings are not violated for a specified period of
time, the criminal charges are ultimately dismissed. See infra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
4. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA N.A.
Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in Deferred
Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012) [hereinafter DOJ’s HSBC Press Release], available at
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-crm-1478.html.
5. James O’Toole, HSBC: Too Big to Jail?, CNNMoney (Dec. 12, 2012, 1:08 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2012/12/12/news/companies/hsbc-money-laundering.
6. See infra notes 188–195, 202–203 and accompanying text.
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7

into widespread accounting fraud at Enron. The indictment and ultimate
criminal conviction of Andersen triggered the firm’s bankruptcy, and led
8
28,000 individuals to lose their jobs. Intense scrutiny regarding potential
prosecutorial overreaching in the wake of Andersen’s demise, especially
following the Supreme Court’s reversal of the firm’s conviction, caused
the DOJ to abandon its traditional approach of either indicting or
declining to indict corporate defendants in favor of negotiating DPAs and
9
non-prosecution agreements (“NPAs”). The objective underlying this
10
shift was simple: to avoid a repeat of the “Arthur Andersen effect.”
Today, more than ten years after Andersen, the Justice Department’s
11
corporate charging policies have again become the subject of scrutiny.
This time, however, the focus of the criticism is not the potential for the
DOJ to be overzealous in its approach to corporate criminality. Instead the
focus is the possibility that by maintaining a “too big to jail” policy, the
12
DOJ is not being zealous enough. The DOJ has vehemently denied that
it has such a policy, including in public statements by Attorney General
13
Eric Holder himself.

7. See, e.g., Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen
Prosecution, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 107, 109–10 (2006) (describing the Arthur Andersen prosecution as
“misguided”); John C. Danforth, When Enforcement Becomes Harassment, N.Y. Times, May 6, 2003, at
A31 (criticizing the Justice Department for hanging Arthur Andersen for “the actions of a few”).
8. See Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The Department of
Justice’s Corporate Charging Policies, 51 St. Louis U. L.J. 1, 14–15 (2006) (“With the criminal
indictment, Anderson [sic] could no longer audit public companies. Twenty-eight thousand people lost
their jobs and Arthur Andersen became a shell of its former self.”); see also infra notes 78–93 and
accompanying text.
9. See generally Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components on Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. (Jan. 20, 2003)
[hereinafter Thompson Memo], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_privwaiv_dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf; Erik Paulsen,
Note, Imposing limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecution Agreement, 82 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1434, 1436 (2007) (explaining that the use of DPAs and non-prosecution agreements “exploded
after the demise of the corporate accounting giant Arthur Andersen”); see also infra notes 94–125 and
accompanying text. NPAs are similar to DPAs in that they are privately negotiated agreements
between the DOJ and a defendant whereby the defendant consents to certain undertakings, which, if
adhered to for a specified time, will result in the resolution of a criminal matter. See generally David
Debold & Kyle C. Barry, Consistency in Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution Agreements: A
Lesson From the World of Federal Sentencing, 20 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 331 (2008) (highlighting the
differences between DPAs and NPAs). The primary difference between a DPA and an NPA is that an
NPA typically does not entail the filing of any criminal charges. Id. at 331.
10. We borrow the phrase “Arthur Andersen effect” from Professor Peter J. Henning. See Peter
J. Henning, The Organizational Guidelines: R.I.P.?, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 312, 314 (2007).
Professor Henning used the term to refer to “the collateral damage from a conviction in which
innocent employees unconnected to the wrongdoing lose their jobs and investments in the firm.” Id.
11. See infra notes 188–195, 202–203 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Shahien Nasiripour & Tom Braithwaite, Finance: Out to Break the Banks, Fin.
Times, May 1, 2013, at 11 (describing popular criticism of the sentiment that banks are too big to fail
and thus too big to jail); see also infra notes 188–195, 202–203 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 196–201, 286–289 and accompanying text.
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This new strand of criticism coincided with two related developments
within the executive and judicial branches of the government, each of
which has the potential to substantially impact the Justice Department’s
future corporate charging practices. We term this coincidence the “too big
to jail” effect. The first development is an inclination on the part of at
least one federal district judge to inject a level of substantive oversight
14
into the process of approving DPAs. In reviewing the HSBC DPA,
Judge John Gleeson issued a groundbreaking opinion articulating a
standard for judicial review of DPAs and assessing the HSBC DPA in
15
light of that standard.
The second development is an emerging willingness on the part of
the Justice Department to pursue criminal charges over DPAs in high16
profile cases involving financial institutions. Only eight days after
entering into the HSBC DPA, the DOJ secured guilty pleas from the
Japanese subsidiaries of the United Bank of Switzerland (“UBS”) and
the Royal Bank of Scotland (“RBS”) for their roles in a scheme to
17
manipulate the London Interbank Offered Rates (“LIBOR”). A few
months later, federal prosecutors indicted S.A.C. Capital Advisors and
three related entities (collectively, “SAC Capital”), one of the nation’s
18
most prominent hedge fund managers, on insider trading charges. SAC
Capital ultimately pleaded guilty to the charges, agreeing to pay
19
$1.8 billion and terminate its investment advisory business. And most
recently, in the largest departure from its post-Andersen corporate
charging policies, the DOJ announced that it had secured a guilty plea
from Credit Suisse Group AG, the Swiss banking giant, for conspiring to
20
aid tax evasion.
This Article examines the impact of these recent developments on
the Justice Department’s historical reliance on deferred prosecutions.
Part I traces the evolution of the DPA from its origins as a mechanism
for alternate resolution of juvenile crime and other minor cases, through

14. See infra notes 204–246 and accompanying text.
15. See United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-0763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *2–4
(E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013).
16. See infra notes 249–294 and accompanying text.
17. Id.
18. See Peter Lattman & Ben Protess, Fund Indicted; Called Magnet for Cheating, N.Y. Times,
July 26, 2013, at A1 (discussing charges filed against S.A.C. Capital).
19. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Guilty Plea
Agreement With SAC Capital Mgmt. Cos. (Nov. 4, 2013) [hereinafter DOJ’s SAC Capital Press
Release], available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/November13/SACPleaPR.php.
20. Under the plea agreement, Credit Suisse would plead guilty to a single charge of conspiring to
aid tax evasion. The fine imposed on Credit Suisse will amount to $2.6 billion. See Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Credit Suisse Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Aid and Assist U.S. Taxpayers in Filing
False Returns (May 19, 2014) [hereinafter Credit Suisse Press Release], available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/May/14-ag-531.html; see also infra notes 290–294 and
accompanying text.
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its early application to corporate criminal cases, to the widespread
adoption of the DPA as prosecutors’ tool of choice in the years following
21
Andersen’s collapse.
22
Part II reviews the advantages and disadvantages of modern DPAs.
The Part shows how deferrals are an effective means of achieving the
benefits of criminal prosecution while avoiding undesirable collateral
23
consequences. Part II also notes, however, that corporate defendants’
incentive to avoid criminal charges at all cost, coupled with the absence of
any outside check on prosecutors’ discretion to structure the conditions of
deferral, have resulted in agreements that have been criticized as
24
onerous.
Part III reviews the post-financial crisis and the emergence of the
“too big to jail” construct. It tracks the emerging concern that the Justice
Department has accorded undue weight to collateral consequences in
forming its charging decisions, emanating from the DOJ’s failure to bring
any crisis-related prosecutions of financial institutions and the HSBC
25
DPA.
Part IV examines the “too big to jail” effect by tracing recent events
that transpired in ‘close temporal proximity to the surge in criticism of
DOJ charging practices. The Part first reviews Judge Gleeson’s opinion in
26
the HSBC case. While the standard of review Gleeson’s opinion
establishes is of questionable value as a check on prosecutorial discretion,
it is nevertheless the first time that a court has been willing to assume a
27
substantive role in approving DPAs. The Part questions whether Judge
Gleeson’s opinion opens the door to more affirmative judicial review in
the future.
Next, Part IV outlines the LIBOR, SAC Capital, and Credit Suisse
28
prosecutions. The significance of these cases cannot be understated, as
it had been more than twenty years since the Justice Department filed
29
criminal charges against a major financial institution. The Part explores
whether these cases signal a shift away from the DOJ’s decade-long

21. See infra Parts I.A–B.
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Part II.B.
24. See infra Part II.A.
25. See infra Parts III.A, B.2.
26. See infra Part IV.A.
27. See, e.g., John F. Savarese et al., New Standards for Judicial Approval of Deferred Prosecution
Agreements, 50 Bank & Corp. Governance L. Rep. 907, 907 (2013) (describing the novelty of Judge
Gleeson’s judicial review).
28. See infra Part IV.
29. See Peter J. Henning, UBS Settlement Minimizes Impact of Guilty Plea, N.Y. Times DealBook
(Dec. 20, 2012, 1:54 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/ubs-settlement-minimizes-impact-ofguilty-plea (“[T]he guilty plea by the UBS subsidiary is the first time an arm of [a] major financial
institution has been convicted of a crime since Drexel Burnham was more than 20 years ago.”).
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resort to DPAs as the preferred means to address corporate crime, and
30
thus whether more aggressive tactics can be expected going forward.
The Article concludes in Part V by arguing that DPAs should not be
31
abandoned as the default approach in corporate criminal cases. Instead,
Congress should follow Judge Gleeson’s lead and amend the Speedy
Trial Act to expressly require substantive judicial review of the terms of
32
DPAs. Doing so would inject a measure of independence to guard
against both prosecutorial leniency and excess. To this end, a standard for
judicial review is proposed that is designed to maximize the benefits of
deferred prosecutions while minimizing the concerns that have historically
33
accompanied their use.

I. The DPA: Federal Prosecutors’ Weapon of Choice to Combat
Corporate Crime
A. The Anatomy of a DPA
The mechanics of a deferred prosecution at the federal level are
simple: once a prosecutor recommends a case for diversion, the pretrial
services agency or the probation office must agree to accept the defendant
34
into the diversion program. In exchange for the prosecutor’s stipulation
to “defer” criminal charges, the defendant agrees to waive indictment and
be charged criminally, and to fulfill certain requirements over a specified
35
period of time. If the defendant discharges her obligations, the charges
against her are dismissed and she is treated as if the government declined
36
to prosecute at the outset. She therefore avoids “the potentially lifelong
collateral consequences of a felony conviction, such as exclusion from
jury service, government benefits, public housing, educational grants, and

30. See infra Parts IV.A–B.
31. See infra Part V.A.
32. See infra Part V.B.
33. See infra Part V.B.
34. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Resource Manual § 712, in U.S. Attorneys’ Manual
(1997) (outlining pre-trial diversion procedures); Steven R. Peikin, Deferred Prosecution Agreements:
Standard
for
Corporate
Probes,
N.Y.
L.J.,
Jan. 31,
2005,
available
at
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/ id=900005422568/Deferred-Prosecution-Agreements:-Standardfor-Corporate-Probes?slreturn=20140117032629.
35. See Peikin, supra note 34. The defendant also agrees to waive her speedy trial rights and the
tolling of any limitations period. See id.
36. Entering into a DPA does not increase a defendant’s criminal history score under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2(f) (1997) (providing
that “[d]iversion from the judicial process without a finding of guilt (e.g., deferred prosecution) is not
counted” as a sentence under U.S. Sentencing Guideline (“U.S.S.G.”) § 4A1.1(c)). The same is not true
of guilty pleas, which “result[] in a conviction and collateral consequences attach no differently than if the
offender had been convicted in a trial.” Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution
Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1863,
1869 (2005). Thus, all things considered, a defendant would much prefer diversion to pleading guilty.
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voting.” If the defendant fails to abide by the terms of the deferred
prosecution, however, she faces the specter of criminal prosecution just
38
the same as if the government had never granted a deferral.
The role of the trial court in the deferred prosecution context is
quite different than its role when presented with a guilty plea. When a
defendant enters into a plea bargain, the trial court assumes a substantive
gatekeeper role under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
39
Procedure. The court must examine guilty pleas for “voluntariness,
factual basis, fairness, abuse of discretion, or infringement on the judge’s
40
sentencing power.” If the plea bargain does not satisfy the requirements
41
of Rule 11, the court cannot accept the defendant’s admission of guilt. It
is also the case that the court need not accept a plea bargain if it believes
“that [the] bargain is too lenient, or otherwise not in the public
42
interest.”
The United States Code contemplates a much narrower role for the
district court in the deferred prosecution context. While the Speedy Trial
Act provides that a DPA must be presented to the district court for its
approval, the Act is silent as to how the court should exercise its
43
discretion. It says only that “with the approval of the court,” the
44
government may defer prosecution pursuant to a written agreement.
Predictably, therefore, district courts routinely rubber stamp DPAs the

37. Greenblum, supra note 36, at 1866–67.
38. Some courts have held that prosecutors cannot unilaterally determine that a defendant
breached her obligations under a DPA. Rather, there must be a judicial determination to that effect.
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 406 F.3d 323, 334 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[I]n the context of nonprosecution agreements the government is prevented by due process considerations from unilaterally
determining that a defendant is in breach and nullifying the agreement.”); United States v. Meyer,
157 F.3d 1067, 1077 (7th Cir. 1998) (“In accordance with due process, [the defendant] was entitled to a
judicial determination that he had breached the agreement before being subjected to the risk of
conviction.”). Nevertheless, it has become standard fare for prosecutors to include within DPAs a
stipulation to the effect that it is solely within the prosecutor’s discretion to determine whether the
DPA has been breached. See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 Va. L. Rev. 853,
919 (2007) (observing that most DPAs permit a unilateral finding of breach).
39. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)–(3); see also Garrett, supra note 38, at 906 (“Federal courts are
more involved in reviewing plea bargains than charging decisions.”).
40. Garrett, supra note 38, at 906.
41. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2)–(3).
42. United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1462 (10th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the United States Sentencing Guidelines provide that in the
case of charge bargains, “the court may accept the agreement if the court determines, for reasons
stated on the record, that the remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual
offense behavior and that accepting the agreement will not undermine the statutory purposes of
sentencing or the sentencing guidelines.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 6B1.2(a) (2013).
43. The Speedy Trial Act provides district judges with the power to approve DPAs, but does not
otherwise specify judicial involvement in the DPA process. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2012).
44. Id.
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same day they are presented for approval. Indeed, in the corporate
criminal prosecution context, no court has rejected, much less modified,
46
a DPA.
B. The Evolution of DPAs as the Tool of Choice to Combat
Corporate Crime
1. The E.F. Hutton, Drexel, and Salomon Cases
Historically, prosecutors viewed their charging decision as a stark
47
choice between indicting or declining to file charges. The concept of
deferring prosecution rose to prominence in the 1960s to provide a third
48
option between these two extremes. Deferred prosecutions were initially
utilized only in relatively minor cases against individual offenders in the
state system, such as cases involving juveniles and small-time narcotics
offenders, “where prosecution would be counterproductive, ineffective or
49
unwarranted.”
The federal prosecutions of E.F. Hutton (“Hutton”) in 1985 and
Drexel Burnham Lambert (“Drexel”) in 1989 suggested that a middle
option would be desirable in the corporate context as well. After Hutton
pleaded guilty to multiple counts of mail and wire fraud, the company

45. See Douglas Gillison, HSBC Judge, Reluctant to Bless Settlement, Explores Court’s Role, Main
Justice (Mar. 29, 2013, 6:31 PM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2013/03/29/hsbc-judge-reluctant-tobless-settlement-explores-courts-role (providing a chart that illustrates that in the last four years,
Judge Gleeson is the only district judge to have spent more than two days reviewing the terms of a
DPA involving a large bank).
46. See Garrett, supra note 38, at 893 (noting that while “[c]ourts have statutory authority to
approve deferral of a prosecution, . . . no court has rejected an agreement”—at least in the case of
corporate crime); Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the
Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96 Ky. L.J. 1, 14 (2007) (“Deferred and non-prosecution
agreements often occur without judicial oversight or participation . . . . Even in the rare case that has
court participation, it is usually a mere formality of the document being filed in the court.”); Dieter
Juedes, Taming the FCPA Overreach Through an Adequate Procedures Defense, 4 Wm. & Mary Bus.
L. Rev. 37, 49 (2013) (“[A]lthough a DPA is filed with a court and could be subject to judicial scrutiny,
the agreements are regularly ‘rubber-stamped’ by judges without modification.”).
47. In the corporate criminal liability context, most prosecutors “believed their expertise lay in
determining retrospective questions of criminal liability,” rather than designing prospective corporate
governance reforms as part of a deferred prosecution. Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New
Regulators’: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 159, 164 (2008).
48. See Developments in the Law—Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1863, 1902–03
(1998) (indicating that the formal practice of deferring prosecution “was developed first in the juvenile
courts, but flourished outside the juvenile context after the Supreme Court’s 1962 decision in
Robinson v. California,” which held that “a state law which imprisons a person . . . [for a ‘status
offense’ such as drug addiction] inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment” (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962))).
49. State v. Leonardis, 363 A.2d 321, 323 (N.J. 1976); see Greenblum, supra note 36, at 1866–71
(tracing the development of deferred prosecutions).
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was drastically weakened and forced to merge with a competitor. A
year after Drexel’s guilty plea to various securities fraud and other
charges, the firm filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection when it could
51
not fund more than $100 million in loans. These cases contributed to the
general perception that a criminal conviction was not the preferred means
52
of rehabilitating a corporation and achieving maximum deterrence.
The opportunity to leverage a third option in the corporate context
first arose in 1992 in connection with the DOJ’s investigation of Salomon
Brothers (“Salomon”) for submitting false and unauthorized bids to
purchase U.S. Treasury notes in violation of the federal False Claims
53
54
Act and the Sherman Act. Rather than file charges against Salomon,
federal prosecutors offered Salomon the opportunity to enter into an
55
NPA. In exchange for the government’s promise not to file charges,
Salomon agreed to: (1) pay $290 million in fines, forfeiture, and victim
compensation; (2) continue cooperating with investigators; and
56
(3) implement compliance procedures to prevent similar wrongdoing.
To justify this novel move, then-U.S. Attorney for the Southern District
of New York, Otto Obermaier, whose office conducted the investigation,
touted Salomon’s “unprecedented” cooperation, its replacement of key
figures in senior management positions, the civil penalties the Securities

50. E.F. Hutton pleaded guilty to two thousand counts of mail and wire fraud in connection with
its role perpetrating a massive check-kiting scheme, which reportedly involved “obtain[ing] the
interest-free use of millions of dollars by intentionally writing checks in excess of the funds it had on
deposit in various banks.” E.F. Hutton Pleads Guilty to Fraud, Fined $2 Million: Used Checks to Avoid
Interest, L.A. Times, May 2, 1985, at 1. The guilty plea required E.F. Hutton to pay $2 million in fines and
$750,000 in costs. Id. At the time, E.F. Hutton was one of “Wall Street’s most formidable giants.”
R. William Ide III & Douglas H. Yarn, Public Independent Fact-Finding: A Trust-Generating Institution
for an Age of Corporate Illegitimacy and Public Mistrust, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1113, 1147 (2003).
51. In 1989, Drexel Burnham Lambert, at the time a Wall Street powerhouse and the pioneer of
the high-yield junk bonds, pleaded guilty to six counts of mail, wire, and securities fraud in connection
with allegations that it engaged in insider trading. See Stephen Labaton, Drexel Concedes Guilt on
Trading; to Pay $650 Million, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1988, at A1. The plea agreement required Drexel to
pay $650 million. Id. By pleading guilty, Drexel reportedly escaped racketeering and obstruction of
justice charges. See id.
52. See Davis Polk’s Scott Muller on the Rise of Corporate Deferred Prosecutions, 24 Corp. Crime
Rep.
37,
Sept. 27,
2010,
available
at
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/
scottmuller092710_000.htm (“EF Hutton was prosecuted with over 2,000 counts of mail fraud and had
gone down the tubes. So, there was a real concern about prosecuting financial institutions.”).
53. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012).
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
55. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice and SEC Enter $290 Million
Settlement with Salomon Brothers in Treasury Securities Case (May 20, 1992) [hereinafter DOJ Salomon
Press Release], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1992/211182.htm.
56. See id. Some commentators have opined that if Salomon Brothers had been tried and
convicted it “would have almost certainly resulted in the financial ruin of Salomon, because of the
highly regulated environment in which it operates as well as its dependence on consumer trust.”
F. Joseph Warin & Jason C. Schwartz, Deferred Prosecution: The Need for Specialized Guidelines for
Corporate Defendants, 23 J. Corp. L. 121, 124 (1997).
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and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) imposed, and the collateral
57
consequences an indictment would have triggered.
2. Prosecutors’ First Use of a DPA in the Corporate Crime Context
The Salomon NPA is credited with laying the groundwork for the
58
first use of a DPA in the corporate crime context. This occurred two
years later, as federal prosecutors confronted evidence that Prudential
Securities (“Prudential”) had committed securities fraud in connection
59
with sale of partnership interests in one of Prudential’s mutual funds.
As in the Salomon case, the DOJ stopped short of prosecuting
Prudential. Instead, then-United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, Mary Jo White, signed off on the deferred
prosecution of Prudential for a period of three years, provided that the
company: (1) paid $330 million; (2) cooperated with the government’s
investigation; and (3) appointed an independent director to Prudential’s
board to “serve as an independent ‘ombudsman’ whom [Prudential]
employees can call anonymously with complaints about ethics and
60
compliance.” In announcing the settlement, White noted that “[t]he
61
public interest is well served by this agreement” because “[u]pon
conviction, a corporation cannot be sentenced to jail but only to pay
restitution, fines and adopt measures aimed at enhancing internal
62
controls to prevent and detect future wrongdoing.” In White’s view, the
63
Prudential DPA “impose[d] such sanctions.”

57. DOJ Salomon Press Release, supra note 55.
58. See Davis Polk’s Scott Muller on the Rise of Corporate Deferred Prosecutions, supra note 52
(noting that the Prudential Securities DPA was the “first ever” DPA in the corporate context); see
also Spivack & Raman, supra note 47, at 163–64 (“Though the Salomon case did not involve a formal
non-prosecution agreement, it provided a clear message to companies that full cooperation, and the
sincere willingness to clean house, could lead to favorable results.”).
59. See generally Deferred Prosecution, Prudential Securities Inc. (S.D.N.Y 1994) (Mag. No. 94),
available
at
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/sites/default/files/pdf/
prudential.pdf.
60. See id. at *5–6. Notably, Mary Jo White, the pioneer of the corporate DPA, has been one of the
strongest critics of the manner in which DPAs have been deployed. See An Informed and Forceful
Critique of NPAs and DPAs By . . . Guess Who?, FCPA Professor (Apr. 25, 2013),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/an-informed-and-forceful-critique-of-npas-and-dpas-by-guess-who
(providing numerous instances in which Mary Jo White criticized the Justice Department’s use of DPAs).
61. See Kurt Eichenwald, Brokerage Firm Admits Crimes in Energy Deals, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28,
1994, at A1.
62. Letter from Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney, to Scott W. Muller and Carey R. Dunne,
Attorneys for Prudential Sec. Inc. (Oct. 27, 1994) (on file with Authors).
63. Id.
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3. The Sparing Use of DPAs in the 1990s
The Salomon and Prudential cases are credited with providing the
64
framework for the modern DPA. Yet DPAs did not become a mainstay
of corporate criminal prosecutions until about a decade later. The
prevailing view in the late 1990s and early 2000s was that it took a “very
special situation” for prosecutors to defer the prosecution of an
65
organizational defendant. The mindset was that the prosecutor’s job
66
was simply to “charge or not.”
The consensus among commentators is that the “indict or walk
away” dichotomy prevailed because the Justice Department provided no
67
guidance to prosecutors regarding when or how to utilize DPAs. The
then-existing version of the United States Attorneys’ Manual made no
68
mention of corporate DPAs. Deferrals were discussed only in
69
conjunction with individual prosecutions. In light of this deficiency, and

64. See, e.g., Leonard Orland, The Transformation of Corporate Criminal Law, 1 Brook. J. Corp.
Fin. & Com. L. 45, 62 (2006) (noting that the “Salomon Brothers and Prudential Securities dispositions
formed the model for scores of subsequent agreements”); Greenblum, supra note 36, at 1873 (citing
the Salomon Brothers and Prudential Securities agreements as having “laid the groundwork for the
more widespread and varied use of the mechanism in the modern era”).
65. Interview with Mary Jo White, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, New York,
19 Corp. Crime Rep. 48, Dec. 12, 2005 [hereinafter White Interview], available at
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/maryjowhiteinterview010806.htm. Years after signing off on
the Prudential Securities DPA, Mary Jo White observed that “[i]t was certainly not something [she]
thought [she] was likely to do again.” Id.
66. Id.
67. See Spivack & Raman, supra note 47, at 164 (“The gray, uncertain area of deferrals seemed to
invite prosecutors to insinuate themselves into prospective corporate governance issues. This was
unappealing, especially considering the absence of formal guidance from DOJ regarding
organizational prosecutions.”); see also Warin & Schwartz, supra note 56, at 130 (noting that when
federal prosecutors in the 1990s were “confronted with an organizational defendant for whom pre-trial
diversion might seem appropriate,” the decision whether to employ a DPA was left entirely to
prosecutors’ discretion, “with few if any applicable standards upon which to rely”).
68. As a number of commentators have observed, pre-trial diversion was (and still is) “drafted with a
view towards pre-trial diversion of individuals, not businesses.” See Finder & McConnell, supra note 8, at
11; see also Warin & Schwartz, supra note 56, at 130 (“The specific standards for implementation are
designed for individual defendants (primarily first offenders charged with less serious and non-violent
crimes) and are inapplicable to corporate and other organizational defendants.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The current version of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual provides that a prosecutor “may divert
any individual against whom a prosecutable case exists and who is not”:
1. Accused of an offense which, under existing Department guidelines, should be diverted
to the State for prosecution;
2. A person with two or more prior felony convictions;
3. A public official or former public official accused of an offense arising out of an alleged
violation of a public trust; or
4. Accused of an offense related to national security or foreign affairs.
Compare U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 9-22.100 (2011) (emphasis added), with U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 712 (1997) (outlining pre-trial diversion procedures).
69. See U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 712.
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in the absence of any further instruction, prosecutors viewed the
70
corporate charging decision as binary.
This remained the case even after then-Deputy Attorney General
Eric Holder issued the “Federal Prosecution of Corporations,” colloquially
71
referred to as the “Holder Memo,” in 1999. The Holder Memo, which
provided corporate charging guidance to prosecutors, marked the first
time the Justice Department “officially recognized what had become
obvious to federal prosecutors and judges: corporate charging and
sentencing decisions involve distinct variables from those at play in the
72
charging of individuals.” To this end, the Holder Memo memorialized
eight factors that federal prosecutors should consider in determining
73
whether to indict a corporation. These factors included: (1) the nature
and seriousness of the offense; (2) the pervasiveness of the wrongdoing
within the corporation; (3) the corporation’s history of similar conduct;
(4) its timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and willingness to
cooperate; (5) the adequacy of its compliance program; (6) the
corporation’s remedial actions; (7) collateral consequences; and (8) the
74
adequacy of non-criminal remedies.
While the Holder Memo injected a degree of standardization into
an otherwise idiosyncratic corporate charging regime, it failed to provide
parameters governing the use of DPAs. In fact, the Memo failed to even
acknowledge the existence of DPAs as an alternative vehicle to punish
75
and rehabilitate corporate wrongdoers. Not surprisingly, then, in 2000,
the year after the Holder Memo was published, there remained a
significant gulf between the number of corporate convictions and
76
deferrals. And on the rare occasions when DPAs were employed, they

70. See Greenblum, supra note 36, at 1871 (“Before the Justice Department recognized and
promulgated standards specific to corporate deferral in 1999, prosecutors were understandably
hesitant to resort to the mechanism, explaining its infrequent use in the 1990s.”).
71. Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Component
Heads & U.S. Atty’s, Federal Prosecution of Corporations (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder
Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-corps.pdf.
72. Ryan D. McConnell et al., Plan Now or Pay Later: The Role of Compliance in Criminal Cases,
33 Hous. J. Int’l L. 509, 534 (2011).
73. See Holder Memo, supra note 71, at Part II.
74. See id.
75. See Finder & McConnell, supra note 8, at 11 (criticizing the Holder Memo’s failure to provide
any guidance regarding how to implement the eight factors when deciding whether to defer prosecution
and its failure to mention any of the DPAs or NPAs that predated the Memo); see also Rachel Delaney,
Comment, Congressional Legislation: The Next Step for Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements,
93 Marq. L. Rev. 875, 885–86 (2009) (observing that the Holder Memo was not specific to the deferred
prosecution context, did not provide predictable rules for prosecutorial behavior, and did not provide
protection or enforceable rights for business entities under investigation).
76. While the number of organizational defendants convicted peaked at three hundred, see
Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1775, 1801–04 (2011), the
number of DPAs entered into reached only two. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2013 Mid-year
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were “relatively primitive” and “less draconian” compared to the
77
modern iteration of DPAs.
4. The Arthur Andersen Case
The collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2002 is generally viewed as the
78
event that triggered emergence of the modern DPA. The events
79
surrounding Arthur Andersen’s demise have been well documented.
Just one month after the September 11th terrorist attacks, Enron
Corporation, one of the largest and most revered companies, shocked the
financial community when it revealed a $610 million third-quarter loss
80
and $1.2 billion reduction of shareholder equity. The news triggered an
SEC investigation into Enron’s accounting practices, directly implicating
81
its lead auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP. On October 23, 2001, after
learning of the SEC’s investigation, David Duncan, the Andersen
partner in charge of the Enron engagement, instructed his team to follow
82
the firm’s document-retention policy. The unmistakable meaning of this
message was to destroy Enron-related documents, which is exactly what

Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution
Agreements (NPAs) 1 (2013) [hereinafter Gibson 2013 Mid-year Update].
77. As Professors Finder and McConnell note, early DPAs did not require an admission of
wrongdoing, did not include the appointment of a compliance monitor, and were limited to
compliance reforms. See Finder & McConnell, supra note 8, at 5–7. It was not until the early 2000s that
DPAs would take on a more punitive character, and their use would become widespread. See infra,
notes 112–125 and accompanying text.
78. See James R. Copeland, The Shadow Regulatory State: The Rise of Deferred Prosecution
Agreements, Civ. Justice Rep., May 2012, at 11 (attributing the dramatic rise in DPAs to the collapse
of Arthur Andersen); Paulsen, supra note 9, at 1436 (finding that the use of DPAs and NPAs
“exploded after the demise of the corporate accounting giant Arthur Andersen”).
79. For a thorough account, see generally Bethany McLean & Peter Elkind, The Smartest
Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron (2003).
80. See Alexei Barrionuevo, 2 Enron Chiefs are Convicted in Fraud and Conspiracy Trial:
Appeals Expected, N.Y. Times, May 26, 2006, at A1.
81. This was not the first time Arthur Andersen found itself in the government’s crosshairs. Just
months before the accounting improprieties at Enron came to light, Andersen settled a lawsuit
brought against it by the SEC for its role in the $1.7 billion accounting fraud at Waste Management
Inc. See Michael Schroeder, SEC Fines Arthur Andersen in Fraud Case: Big 5 Firm to Pay $7 Million
After Inquiry of Audits for Waste Management, Wall St. J., June 20, 2001, at A3. Under the
settlement agreement, Andersen was required to, among other things, pay $7 million in fines—at the
time, the largest fine ever imposed against an accounting firm. See id.; see also Kathleen F. Brickey,
Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 Wash. U. L. Q. 917, 922–24 (2003) (describing the settlement
agreement that Andersen entered into with the SEC). Indeed, “the Waste Management litigation was
the first time the SEC had ever accused a major accounting firm of securities fraud in connection with
a failed audit.” Id. at 922. The settlement agreement also enjoined Andersen from committing future
violations of federal securities laws. Id. at 923.
82. See Dan Ackman, Duncan Fingers Former Firm, Forbes (May 14, 2002, 8:53 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/2002/05/14/0514topnews.html (quoting David Duncan as saying: “I instructed
people on the Enron engagement team to follow the document-retention policy, which I knew would
result in the destruction of documents”). David Duncan pleaded guilty to a single count of obstruction
of justice—the same charge Andersen faced. Id.
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83

transpired en masse. The document destruction ceased one week after it
began, when the SEC issued a subpoena to Andersen to turn over its
84
Enron-related work. Andersen’s counsel learned of the massive
destruction of documents in the process of responding to this and other
85
subpoenas.
Recognizing that a “criminal indictment would be tantamount to a
86
death sentence,” Andersen went to great lengths to convince the Justice
Department that it need not put the entire firm out of business because
87
of the actions of a few. The key sticking point in the negotiations was
the prosecutors’ insistence that Andersen admit wrongdoing as a firm, a
non-option for Andersen because it would qualify as a clear violation of
88
an earlier SEC injunction. Andersen’s proposed compromise was to
admit that some of its employees engaged in wrongdoing, but not the
89
entire firm.
90
The DOJ refused to accept this proposal, however, and on
March 14, 2002, Andersen was indicted on one felony count of obstructing
justice. One month later, on June 15, 2002, a jury found the firm guilty.
Andersen was subsequently fined $500,000 and sentenced to five years
91
probation. By this time, however, the firm’s fate was already sealed.
After the grand jury issued the indictment, the firm could no longer audit
92
public companies. Andersen folded, and with it 28,000 employees lost
93
their jobs.

83. See id.
84. See Brickey, supra note 81, at 920 (reporting that Andersen’s destruction of Enron-related
documents began on October 23, 2001, and ended on November 9, 2001—a day after it received a subpoena
from the SEC). There was, of course, nothing routine about the document destruction. See id. at 935 n.93
(noting that a spokesmen for Arthur Andersen “admitted that the shredding was not routine”).
85. See id. at 935.
86. Id. at 921.
87. Andersen promised to, among other things: (1) clean house in its management ranks;
(2) institute a new system of compliance; and (3) appoint an independent monitor to ensure that its
employees would abide by the law going forward. Id. at 924–25. Andersen also waged a $1.5 million
public relations campaign to rehabilitate its image and “humanize [its] plight.” See id. at 942 n.129.
Among its public-relations moves was hiring former chair of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker, to
head an independent oversight board to identify and remedy management and accountability
problems. See James Kelly, The Power of an Indictment and the Demise of Arthur Andersen, 48 S. Tex.
L. Rev. 509, 513 (2006); see also Brickey, supra note 81, at 942 (describing Enron-staged
demonstrations in Houston, Philadelphia, and Washington D.C.).
88. Id. at 925–26.
89. Id. at 926.
90. See id. at 926.
91. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 702 (2005).
92. See Finder & McConnell, supra note 8, at 14–15 (“With the criminal indictment, [Andersen]
could no longer audit public companies. Twenty-eight thousand people lost their jobs and Arthur
Andersen became a shell of its former self.”).
93. See id.
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5. The Post-Andersen Era and the Rise of the Modern DPA
The fallout from Arthur Andersen’s collapse was immediate and
profound. The image of 28,000 people left jobless and one of the nation’s
largest accounting firms being put out of business—when only a few
wrongdoers had been identified—drew allegations of prosecutorial
94
excess. This was especially so after Andersen’s conviction was reversed
95
by the Supreme Court in 2005. The lesson of the Andersen case was
that “a federal indictment could cripple even a strong, well-established
96
company.”
Immense political pressure to avoid a repeat of the Andersen effect
forced the DOJ to take a hard look at its corporate charging policies. What
followed was a dramatic shift away from the traditional indict/decline
97
charging framework for corporate defendants in favor of DPAs.
This shift began with the establishment of the Corporate Fraud Task
98
Force in July 2002, which President George W. Bush created in
response to Enron and a series of high-profile corporate fraud scandals

94. Mary Jo White called the decision to indict Arthur Andersen “‘very wrongheaded’, and a
sacrifice of the best interests of the public in order to ‘message send.’” Alan C. Michaels, Fastow &
Arthur Andersen: Some Reflections on Corporate Criminality, Victim Status, and Retribution, 1 Ohio
St. J. Crim. L. 551, 560 n.39 (2004) (citation omitted). Other former federal prosecutors chastised the
Justice Department for hanging Andersen for “the actions of a few.” John C. Danforth, Op-Ed., When
Enforcement Becomes Harassment, N.Y. Times, May 6, 2003, at A31. The defense bar sounded similar
criticisms, calling the Andersen prosecution “heavy-handed” and an unnecessary “death penalty.”
Elkan Abramowitz & Barry Bohrer, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, N.Y.
L.J., Mar. 4, 2003, at 1.
95. Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 708.
96. Christopher Garcia et al., Collateral Consequences of the UBS and RBS Settlements, Harv. L.
Sch. F. on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. (Mar. 12, 2012, 8:21 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2013/03/12/collateral-consequences-of-the-ubs-and-rbs-libor-settlements.
97. See Elkan Abramowitz & Jonathan Sack, The ‘Civil-izing’ of White-Collar Criminal
Enforcement, N.Y. L.J., May 7, 2013, at 1 (discussing the post-Arthur Andersen shift away from the
criminal prosecution of “among others, banks, pharmaceutical companies and military contractors”).
The Justice Department’s resolve to use greater caution before indicting a multi-national corporation
was put to the test only a few months after the Andersen prosecution, when another accounting
scandal came to light, this time involving Worldcom—then the nation’s second largest long distance
telecommunications company. See Jared Sandberg et al., Disconnected: Inside WorldCom’s Unearthing
of a Vast Accounting Scandal—Internal Auditor Discovered an Unorthodox Treatment of LongDistance Expenses—CFO’s Impassioned Defense, Wall St. J., June 27, 2002, at A1 (detailing nature
of alleged accounting fraud). While Worldcom’s misdeeds were no less egregious than Andersen’s, the
scandal’s revelation coincided with the Andersen backlash directed at the Justice Department. Indeed,
Eric Holder, at the time a former Deputy Attorney General, authored an op-ed in the Wall Street
Journal, entreating his former employer not to indict Worldcom. See Eric Holder, Op-Ed., Don’t
Indict Worldcom, Wall St. J., July 30, 2002, at A14. Holder’s pointed message was: “as public and
political pressures mount for high-profile convictions, the Justice Department must remain true to the
core principles that guide it in the use of its enormous, discretionary power,” and not “feel compelled
to indict more corporations simply because they can.” Id.
98. Exec. Order No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. 13271 (2002). The Corporate Fraud Task Force has since
been renamed the Financial Fraud Task Force, which President Barack Obama created in 2009. Exec.
Order No. 13,519, 3 C.F.R. 13519 (2009).
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99

that shook investor confidence. The task force’s objective was “to hold
wrongdoers responsible and to restore an atmosphere of accountability
100
and integrity within corporations across the country.” To that end, the
task force sought to increase interagency coordination in combating
101
corporate fraud and punishing corporate wrongdoers, and provide for
more coordination between U.S. Attorney’s Offices around the country
102
that were beginning to prosecute white-collar crimes.
Another important development was the publication by thenDeputy Attorney General Larry Thompson of a revised set of guidelines
103
to govern corporate prosecutions. The “Thompson Memo,” as it is
commonly called, was virtually identical to its predecessor, the Holder
104
Memo, with one critical difference: the Thompson Memo explicitly
recognized pre-trial diversion as a viable option to reward a corporation’s
105
authentic cooperation. Although it did not specifically direct prosecutors
to weigh the DPA option before indicting a company, the Thompson
Memo nevertheless “confirmed the status of DPAs . . . as arrows in the
106
government’s quiver.” Combined with a lingering aversion to triggering
another Arthur Andersen-style collapse, it opened the door to widespread
107
adoption of DPAs.
The Justice Department’s wholesale shift in favor of DPAs is
evidenced dramatically by the statistics. From 1994 to 2001, the DOJ

99. See Andrew Weismann & David Newman, Rethinking Corporate Criminal Liability, 82 Ind.
L.J. 411, 424 n.43 (2007) (discussing the post Enron shift to DPAs to “settle accounting fraud
investigations with a series of major corporations or their subsidiaries”).
100. The
President’s
Corporate
Fraud
Task
Force,
U.S.
Dep’t
of
Justice,
http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/cftf (last visited June 1, 2014).
101. See Exec. Order No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. 13271.
102. See Weissman & Newman, supra note 99, at 425 n.46. The engagement of a broader universe
of U.S. Attorney’s Offices in white-collar cases represented a departure from past practice, as large
financial crime cases had generally been prosecuted out of the Southern and Eastern Districts of New
York, or DOJ headquarters in Washington. See Peikin, supra note 34.
103. Thompson Memo, supra note 9.
104. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that the
Thompson Memo was “in many respects . . . a modest revision of the Holder Memorandum”).
105. See Thompson Memo, supra note 9, at pt. IV.B; Resnik & Dougall, supra note 3, at 1
(explaining that the Thompson Memo’s “significance lay in its highlighting of alternatives to corporate
indictment”). The Thompson Memo also instructed prosecutors to consider the “collateral
consequences” of indictment on “shareholders, pension holders and employees not proven personally
culpable.” Thompson Memo, supra note 9, at 3.
106. Spivack & Raman, supra note 47, at 166 n.40.
107. See id. at 166 (stating that the Thompson Memo formalized the recognition of a DPA as “an
alternative somewhere in between the ‘all-or-nothing choice between indicting (and destroying) a
company and giving it a complete ‘pass’”) (quoting Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate
Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 1095, 1103 (2006)); Greenblum, supra note 36, at 1875 n.84 (“There is consensus . . . that the
Thompson Memo was ultimately a catalyst for an increase in corporate deferrals.”); Peikin, supra note 34
(“Since 2003, prosecutors have signed DPAs with an unprecedented number of corporations.”).
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resolved only seven corporate criminal cases via DPAs. Since then, the
109
DOJ has entered into over 250 DPAs, with 100 executed between 2010
110
and 2012 alone. The organizational defendants that have been parties to
these deferrals, moreover, are among the most well-known multinational
111
corporations.
The dramatic uptick in the use of DPAs is not the only remarkable
aspect of the Justice Department’s shift in charging practice. As the use
of DPAs has increased, so too has the severity of the conditions
prosecutors have imposed on corporate defendants. The DPAs that have
been employed in the post-Andersen era have commonly included
112
extremely stiff monetary penalties or restitution to victims. Since 2000,
for example, prosecutors have extracted over $31.6 billion from corporate
113
entities, with more than $9 billion coming in 2012. Between 2005 and
114
2013, total monetary penalties exceeded the billion dollar threshold.
115
Modern DPAs can also include the filing of detailed criminal charges
and some sort of admission or acknowledgement of responsibility on the
116
company’s part. Notably, the defendant is not, under any circumstances,
108. See Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational Prosecution Agreements, U. Va.
Sch. of L. (Apr. 28, 2013), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/home.suphp.
109. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2012 Year-end Update on Corporate Deferred
Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) 1 (2013). Since 2006,
the Justice Department has entered into at least twenty agreements every year, with the exception of
2009, when it entered into nineteen. See Gibson 2013 Mid-year Update, supra note 76, at 1.
110. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2012 Year-end Update on Corporate Deferred
Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) 1 (2013).
111. Approximately sixty-one percent of the corporations entering into DPAs from 2001 to 2012
were public companies or their subsidiaries. See Brandon L. Garrett & David Zaring, For a Better Way
to Prosecute Corporations, Look Overseas, N.Y. Times DealBook (Sept. 24, 2013, 3:43 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/for-a-better-way-to-prosecute-corporations-look-overseas.
Almost one third were Fortune 500 or Global 500 companies. Id. Forbes Magazine has referred to this
list of well-known, multi-national corporations as “Club Fed Deferred.” Janet Novack, Club Fed,
Deferred, Forbes (Aug. 24, 2005, 8:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2005/08/24/kpmg-taxes-deferredcz_jn_0824beltway.html.
112. See Peikin, supra note 34.
113. See Gibson 2013 Mid-year Update, supra note 76, at 1.
114. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2013 Year-end Update on Corporate Deferred
Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) 1 (2014).
115. See Peikin, supra note 34.
116. An admission of wrongdoing is standard fare in the modern DPA. The rationale for requiring
a corporate defendant to “admit a criminal violation and the facts making out that violation,” is to
communicate the same message of wrongdoing as a criminal proceeding. See Samuel W. Buell,
Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Civil Liability, in Prosecutors in the Boardroom: Using
Criminal Law to Regulate Corporate Conduct 91 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds.,
2011) (“[A] DPA is crafted to retain some of the message effects of a criminal proceeding”). The
consequences of such an admission can be devastating if used against the defendant in a collateral civil
proceeding. See Sarah Kelly-Kilgore & Emily M. Smith, Corporate Criminal Liability, 48 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 421, 453 n.227 (2011) (stating that a corporate defendant’s admission of wrongdoing “will be
admissible in subsequent civil litigation and disclosures will likely be discoverable”); Jonathan S. Sack
& Elizabeth Haines, Be Careful What You Wish For: How Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements
Can be Used in Civil Litigation, Bloomberg L. (Jan. 10, 2012), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/
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permitted to publicly contest or dispute its admission of wrongdoing—a
requirement that can have devastating consequences in collateral civil
117
proceedings. Modern DPAs further have incorporated obligations of
ongoing cooperation with the government, including the appointment of
118
corporate monitors and compulsory adherence to separate agreements
119
reached with securities or banking regulators.
Finally, post-Andersen DPAs generally include undertakings to
make significant structural and procedural reforms. Among the more
120
common are changes to the composition of the board of directors;
121
terminating specific officers and employees; improving compliance and
122
123
ethics procedures; exiting specific lines of business; and establishing

practitioner-contributions/deferred-and-non-prosecution-agreements (arguing that factual admissions
in a DPA should be admissible as a an admission by a party opponent under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2)); Michael R. Sklaire & Joshua G. Berman, Deferred Prosecution Agreements:
What is the Cost of Staying in Business?, Wash. Legal Found., June 3, 2005, at 2 (“While a company is
not required to admit guilt as part of the agreement, the company very often will be required to
stipulate to the Government’s presentation of facts—a stipulation that a plaintiff will seek to use
against the corporation in a later civil proceeding.”).
117. Professor Michael Koehler has aptly coined this standard DPA provision, a “muzzle clause.”
Michael
Koehler,
The
‘Muzzle’
Clause,
FCPA
Professor
(Mar. 26,
2013),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-muzzle-clause.
118. The corporate monitor is generally mutually agreed upon. Peikin, supra note 34. The
monitor’s duties include reviewing relevant areas of the company’s business and filing periodic reports
to the government about the corporation’s business and compliance with the DPA. Id. The costs
associated with corporate monitors can easily run into the millions of dollars. See Spivack & Raman,
supra note 47, at 185 (“[T]the simple fact of monitoring can alone cost a company, and its
shareholders, millions of dollars.”). The most prominent example of this came in 2008 when it was
widely reported that former Attorney General John Ashcroft’s consulting firm was awarded an
eighteen month contract valued at $52 million, in connection with the firm’s duties as corporate
monitor for Zimmer Holdings, a medical device company. See Eric Lichtblau, In Justice Shift,
Corporate Deals Replace Trials, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 2008, at A1.
119. DPAs frequently refer to separate agreements between the cooperating defendant and
banking and securities regulators, and condition deferral on compliance with such agreements. See
Peikin, supra note 34. The requirement to continue cooperating with the government can also be
explicit about the type of cooperation to be provided. Id. This includes the requirement to assemble
and organize records, make available any current or former officers or employees, and provide
testimony to establish the authenticity of business records. Id.
120. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶ 12, United States v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc.
(No. 04-0837) (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2004) [hereinafter Computer Associates DPA] (requiring Computer
Associates to add three independent directors to its board).
121. While it is rare for a DPA to expressly contemplate terminating key employees, it is not
uncommon for prosecutors to informally demand such terminations. For example, it has been widely
reported that in connection with the DPA Bristol Meyers-Squibb entered into in 2005, Chris Christie,
the then-U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey, demanded the ouster of Bristol MeyersSquibb’s CEO, Peter Dolan. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 Ind. L.J. 1035,
1070–71 (2008); see also Brooke A. Masters, Bristol-Meyers Ousts Its Chief at Monitor’s Urging; Dolan
Had Led Firm Since 2001, Wash. Post, Sept. 13, 2006, at D1.
122. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶ 11, United States v. Pfizer H.C.P. Corp. (No. 120169) (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2012) (requiring implementation of compliance and ethics program to prevent
and detect violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
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124

business oversight and review committees. While the central aim of these
reforms is purportedly rehabilitative, they have been known to include
125
obligations that bear no relation to the criminal conduct at hand.

II. The Benefits and Drawbacks of the Modern DPA Regime
A. Common Criticisms of the Modern DPA
The Justice Department’s resort to the modern DPA as the
preferred measure in the corporate crime context has been a magnet for
criticism. Some have expressed the view that DPAs do not achieve the
objectives of criminal sanctions because they are not sufficiently punitive
126
and do not deter future violations of the criminal law. Most, however,
127
contend that DPAs invite an unhealthy degree of prosecutorial excess.
One way in which the potential for excess manifests is prosecutorial
intrusion into matters of corporate governance. The prosecutor’s role is
generally understood to be limited to determining whether a given case
128
merits federal prosecution and, if so, which charges should be brought.
With deferred prosecutions, however, prosecutors have been tempted

123. A recent example of this is the HSBC DPA, which required HSBC to exit a number of
profitable lines of business. Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶ 5k, United States v. HSBC USA, N.A.
(No. 12-0763) (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2012) (requiring HSBC to exit the bank notes business).
124. See, e.g., Computer Associates DPA, supra note 120, ¶¶ 12(b)–(c) (requiring Computer
Associates to establish a compliance committee and disclosure committee).
125. The most prominent example of this is the Bristol Meyers-Squibb DPA, which required the
company to endow a business ethics chair at Seton Hall University School of Law—the alma mater of
the then-U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey, Chris Christie. Deferred Prosecution
Agreement ¶ 20, SEC v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb (Civ. No. 04-3680 (FSH)) (2006), available at
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/sites/default/files/pdf/bristol-meyers.pdf.
126. Professor Mike Koehler has argued that prosecutors’ reliance on DPAs “allow egregious
instances of corporate conduct to be resolved too lightly . . . . without adequate sanctions and without
achieving maximum deterrence.” See Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Under the
Microscope, 15 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 1, 19 (2012); see also Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, The
Debate About Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 6, 2012, at 3 (discussing the
view that DPAs and NPAs “allow[] corporate criminals to receive no more than a slap on the wrist
and making the decision to police criminal activity within a corporation ‘just another dollars-and-cents
decision’”) (citation omitted); David M. Uhlmann, Op-Ed., Prosecution Deferred, Justice Denied, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 13, 2013, at A23 (“The failure to prosecute the likes of JPMorgan, HSBC and Massey
minimizes their culpability and raises doubts about the government’s commitment to fighting
corporate crime.”).
127. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 9, at 1458 (“[P]rosecution agreement[s] . . . offer[] a relatively onesided negotiation where the prosecutor can ask for almost anything.”). While we do not suggest that
prosecutors make a conscious decision to exploit the power they possess, “they are, like the rest of us,
only human.” Jeffrey S. Parker, Developing Consensus Solutions to Overcriminalization Problems: The
Way Ahead, 7 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y, 725, 735 (2011) (cautioning against relying on prosecutorial discretion
to cabin Congress’s over criminalization). And, as John Coffee has observed, there is no denying that
“power corrupts and . . . prosecutors are starting to possess something close to absolute power.” John C.
Coffee Jr., Deferred Prosecution: Has it Gone Too Far?, Nat’l L.J., July 25, 2005, at 13.
128. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (“Whether to prosecute and what charge
to file or bring before a grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor’s discretion.”).
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“to experiment with corporate governance in ways that exceed their
129
Critics contend that a continued
competence or entitlement.”
government presence in the daily affairs of a corporation can act as a
130
drag on company’s business development and stock price. These critics
believe that the government should withdraw when a corporation has
responded appropriately to past wrongdoing and corrected deficiencies
131
in controls, compliance, and corporate culture. Indeed, Mary Jo White,
one of the most vocal critics of the potential for prosecutorial excess in
the use of DPAs despite having pioneered their use in corporate criminal
cases, has cautioned: “For a prosecutor to get into the business of
132
changing corporate culture is skating on fairly thin ice.”
In addition to prosecutorial intrusion into corporate affairs, critics
argue that the risk of collateral consequences of a criminal indictment—
that is, the risk of an Arthur Andersen-style collapse—leaves corporations
133
with no choice but to settle at all costs. The corporations are therefore
compelled to agree to the prosecutors’ terms, vesting nearly absolute
134
power in the government’s hands. Armed with this unchecked power,
prosecutors are free to assume “the role of judge (interpreting the law)
135
and of legislature (setting broad policy choices about industry conduct).”
Moreover, without the option to take the government to trial or the
availability of appellate review, “prosecutors can too easily take advantage

129. Coffee, supra note 127. The inclusion of corporate governance reforms in DPAs is by no means a
modern innovation. In regard to the nature of these reforms, “the intrusiveness of . . . corporate decisionmaking has recently increased.” See id.; see also Garrett, supra note 38, at 936 (“Federal prosecutors have
stepped far outside of their traditional role of obtaining convictions, and, in doing so, seek to reshape the
governance of leading corporations, public entities, and ultimately entire industries.”); Mary Jo White,
Corporate Criminal Liability: What Has Gone Wrong?, in 37th Annual Institute on Securities
Regulation 815, 820 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1517, 2005) (describing
prosecutors’ use of DPAs to “force companies to behave and reform themselves as the prosecutors,
fashioning themselves as the new corporate governance experts”).
130. White, supra note 129 (“[Government intrusion] can . . . retard further progress and act as a
drag on the company’s business and stock price”).
131. See id. (“Most cases of corporate crime should result in no action by the government against
corporations that have responded appropriately to the wrongdoing and any remaining problems of
controls, compliance and corporate culture. There is no need for continued government presence.”).
132. White Interview, supra note 65.
133. See Paulsen, supra note 9, at 1436 (“It has become increasingly clear that the government
holds all the cards in negotiations over [DPAs]. As long as the threat of prosecution lingers over a
company, the corporation is compelled to agree to the prosecutor’s terms, vesting nearly absolute
power in the government’s hands.”); id. at 1457 (“Without the threat of trial, however, there is no
assurance that the prosecutor is acting in a judicious manner.”); Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA
Enforcement, 41 Geo. J. Int’l L. 907, 997 (2010) (prosecutors occupy positions of “advocate, judge,
and rule-maker,” and “induce settlement through the ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ they possess even though
many of the enforcement theories leading to these resolutions are untested and dubious”).
134. See Copeland, supra note 78, at 12; see also Paulsen, supra note 9, at 1459.
135. See Copeland, supra note 78, at 12; see also Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Innocence:
Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk Game, 85 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 77, 87 (2010).
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of vague criminal statutes to pursue new and inappropriate theories of
136
criminal conduct.”
In sum, as currently employed in the corporate crime context, the
deferred prosecution is viewed as placing too much unfettered discretion
in the hands of the DOJ.
B. Arguments in Support of Modern DPAs
Despite the potential they create for prosecutorial abuse, DPAs
have become the preferred method of resolving corporate criminal
investigations in the post-Andersen era because modern DPAs are
widely regarded as providing substantial benefits to both the Justice
Department and corporations. From the corporations’ perspective, the
advantages are easy to understand. The Andersen case painted a vivid
137
picture of the devastating consequences of a corporate prosecution.
Since Andersen, no corporations have collapsed after entering into
DPAs with the government. The prospect of avoiding the stigma of
criminal charges and a possible death sentence therefore makes pretrial
diversion the preferable alternative.
From the Justice Department’s perspective, DPAs minimize the
likelihood of collateral damage while allowing the DOJ to achieve most
138
Filing a criminal charge permits the
of its desired remedies.
government to express its negative view of the corporation’s conduct
publicly, sending a message of the kind of behavior that it will not

136. See Michael N. Levy, Prosecutorial Common Law? A Reality in the Absence of Timely
Appellate Review, McKee Nelson LLP White Collar/Investigations and Enforcement, Spring
2008, at 1 (2008). As Professor William J. Stunz noted, the risk of convicting an innocent defendant is
particularly acute in white-collar cases. See William J. Stunz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 Va. L. Rev.
1871, 1883 (2000). In contrast to street crime, the challenge for prosecutors is not proving that the
“defendant did something;” rather, “what isn’t clear is whether what the defendant did amounts to
fraud.” See id.; see also Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 311, 339–40 (2007). Nowhere is this more relevant than in the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) prosecutions. Many key provisions of the FCPA are ambiguous. See
generally Court E. Golumbic & Jonathan P. Adams, The “Dominant Influence” Test: The FCPA’s
“Instrumentality” and “Foreign Official” Requirements and the Investment Activity of Sovereign Wealth
Funds, 39 Am. J. Crim. L. 1 (2011). Prosecutors have taken advantage of this ambiguity to adopt ever
more aggressive interpretations in negotiations with corporate defendants that are all too uneasy to go
to trial. See id. at 27; see also John Ashcroft & John Ratcliffe, The Recent and Unusual Evolution of an
Expanding FCPA, 26 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 25, 33 (2012) (crediting DPAs for the
expansion of FCPA enforcement activity). Despite the U.S. government’s aggressive interpretation of
the FCPA’s provisions, virtually no corporate defendants, big or small, have contested FCPA charges
in court for the past two decades. Id. Instead, corporations routinely settle FCPA charges through
DPAs and NPAs—a practice that has immunized the Justice Department’s enforcement theories from
any meaningful scrutiny. The upshot, critics contend, is that the FCPA means “what the enforcement
agencies say it means.” Levy, supra, at 1.
137. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text.
138. Garrett, supra note 38, at 855 (stating that DPAs allow organizations to “avoid[] the collateral
consequences of an indictment” while achieving institutional reform).
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139

condone. In addition, the large fines that have been an element of
modern DPAs are an effective method for exacting punishment and
140
making restitution. DPAs further permit the DOJ to ensure good
corporate citizenship by mandating specific reforms, controlling how
future business is conducted, monitoring the corporation’s behavior, and
threatening prosecution should the corporation fail to comply with the
141
DPA.
Finally, the prevalence of DPAs can to some degree be attributed to
corporations having satisfied the government’s expectations in responding
to criminal investigations. DPAs often cite corporate cooperation and the
undertaking of remedial measures as reason for deferring prosecution.
DPAs can therefore be seen as a tangible reward for positive behavior,
particularly in the face of a criminal investigation.
It is for all of the above reasons that then-Assistant Attorney General
Lanny Breuer opined:
A DPA has the same punitive, deterrent, and rehabilitative effect as a
guilty plea: when a company enters into a DPA with the government,
or an NPA for that matter, it almost always must acknowledge
wrongdoing, agree to cooperate with the government’s investigation,
pay a fine, agree to improve its compliance program, and agree to face
prosecution if it fails to satisfy the terms of the agreement. All of these
142
components of DPAs are critical for accountability.

III. The Post-Financial Crisis Period and the Emergence of the
“Too Big to Jail” Construct
A. Sowing the Seeds of “Too Big to Jail”
The financial crisis of 2008 wreaked havoc on Main Street and Wall
143
Street and was followed by a deep global economic downturn. In the
aftermath of the crisis, the Justice Department came under increasing
political pressure to take tougher measures against financial institutions
144
deemed responsible for triggering the collapse. As a consequence, the
DOJ’s historical reliance on DPAs has been called into question.

139. See Buell, supra note 116, at 91.
140. Indeed, in this respect, DPAs may be more effective than prosecution, since they allow the
government to set fines without regard to statutory limits, and collect restitution without complying
with the often cumbersome restitution statute (i.e., without loss calculations, identifying specific
victims and complying with strict jurisdictional time limits). See Peikin, supra note 34, at 5.
141. See id.
142. See Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer Speaks at the New York City Bar Association,
Justice News (Sept. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Breuer’s N.Y. City Bar Remarks],
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crm-speech-1209131.html.
143. For a brief primer on the causes of the financial crisis, see Viral V. Acharya & Matthew
Richardson, Restoring Financial Stability 12–25 (2009) (examining causes of the financial crisis).
144. Many wondered whether the DOJ would employ the same “brass-knuckle” approach it used
in the wake of the savings and loan crisis, when it launched thousands of prosecutions, or whether it
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The political scrutiny can be traced to May 2009, when Congress
established the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (“FCIC”) to
examine the causes of the financial crisis and determine whether it was
145
preventable. Among the FCIC’s findings was that the crisis resulted
from failings of regulators and the financial services sector. According to
the FCIC, the regulators failed to “critically challenge the institutions
146
and the entire system they were entrusted to oversee,” and the banks’
“misjudgments . . . and misdeeds . . . resulted in systemic failures for
147
which our nation has paid dearly.” The FCIC also intimated that a
contributing cause of the financial crisis was widespread mortgage and
148
securities fraud.
While the FCIC’s conclusions had no legal significance, the
committee’s report contributed to the perception that criminally culpable
conduct on the part of financial institutions was a contributing cause of the
149
crisis. Nevertheless, and in stark contrast to the savings-and-loan crisis of
150
the 1980s, not a single financial institution, and few financial institution
151
employees, were criminally prosecuted for their actions.

would continue its post-Andersen approach of settling with rather than prosecuting corporate
wrongdoers. Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, As Wall St. Polices Itself, Prosecutors Use Softer
Approach, N.Y. Times (July 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/business/in-shift-federalprosecutors-are-lenient-as-companies-break-the-law.html.
145. See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 5(a), 123 Stat. 1617,
1626–27. (establishing the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission).
146. Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Complete with
Dissenting Views xviii (2011).
147. Id.
148. Id. at xxii–xxiii (explaining that the FCIC found high rates of mortgage fraud, which
executives continued to engage in even with the threat of a “financial and reputational catastrophe”).
149. See Peter J. Henning, Making Misconduct a Crime, N.Y. Times DealBook (June 24, 2013,
2:13 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/24/making-mismanagement-a-crime (describing the
popular view that criminal conduct by corporations, particularly Wall Street and other financial firms,
contributed significantly to the losses suffered by investors and the broader economy).
150. See Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, A Financial Crisis with Little Guilt, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 13, 2011, at A1.
151. See Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been
Prosecuted?, N.Y. Rev. Books, Jan. 9, 2014 (questioning the “striking contrast” between the number
of prosecutions brought during the savings-and-loan era and the 2008 financial crisis); see also David
Zaring, The Post-Crisis and Its Critics, 12 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 1169, 1169 n.2 (2010) (noting the deep
disparity between the amount of convictions secured after the savings and loan crisis in the early 1990s
and late 1980s and the lack of any convictions after the financial crisis of 2008); Joe Nocera, Biggest
Fish Face Little Risk of Being Caught, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 2011, at B1 (“Two and a half years after the
world’s financial system nearly collapsed, you’re entitled to wonder whether any of the highly paid
executives who helped kindle the disaster will ever see jail time—like Michael Milken in the 1980s, or
Jeffrey Skilling after the Enron disaster. Increasingly, the answer appears to be no. The harder
question, though, is whether anybody should.”); Shahien Nasiripour, Financial Crisis Prosecutions on
Wall Street Slow to Develop Despite Cries for Justice, Huffington Post (Feb. 4, 2011, 3:24 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/04/financial-crisis-prosecutions-wall-streetslow_n_818851.html (noting that in connection with savings-and-loan crisis “roughly 3,800 bankers
were prosecuted and sentenced to prison terms”).
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Defenders of the DOJ’s record attribute the lack of prosecutions to
the difficulty establishing criminal intent in complex financial fraud
152
cases. They also contend that the root cause of the financial crisis was
153
more likely greed and poor judgment than criminal wrongdoing. As
then-Assistant Attorney General Breuer stated, when prosecutors
“cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was criminal intent,
154
then [they] have a constitutional duty not to bring those cases.”
While the Justice Department’s failure to prosecute financial
institutions for their role in the financial crisis can legitimately be
attributed to the inability to establish that a crime occurred, the desire to
avoid the Andersen effect was clearly a consideration as well. In a telling
September 2012 speech to the New York City Bar Association, thenAssistant Attorney General Breuer shed light on the principal factor
driving prosecutors’ decision whether to advance criminal charges
against an organizational defendant. According to Breuer, it was not the
nature of the criminal offense, nor was it the pervasiveness of
155
wrongdoing within a corporation. Rather, the decisive factor was “the

152. Many commentators have made the point that in complex financial cases, criminal intent is
hard to prove “because prosecutors must convince jurors, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a fraud was
intentional.” Jean Eaglesham, Financial Crimes Bedevil Prosecutors, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 2011, at C1.
This is difficult to do in light of the fact that financial crisis investigations are backward looking. That
is, prosecutors step in only long after the fraudulent conduct has taken place, and in turn the
opportunity to gather evidence in a clandestine manner has long passed. See George Packer, A Dirty
Business: New York City’s Top Prosecutor Takes on Wall Street Crime, New Yorker (June 27, 2011),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/06/27/110627fa_fact_packer?currentPage=all (“[C]riminal
law often founders in what prosecutors call a ‘dead-body case.’ During the mortgage bubble, the
possible crimes were committed before any investigation had begun. By the time the government
could have gathered enough evidence to obtain wiretaps, any incriminating conversations would have long
since taken place.”). As evidence of the difficulty in investigating and prosecuting complex financial fraud
cases, commentators point to the inability of federal prosecutors in the Eastern District of New York to
secure convictions against two former Bear Stearns hedge fund managers who were alleged to have
committed securities fraud in connection with the collapse of the investment funds they managed. See
Zachery Kouwe & Dan Slater, 2 Bear Stearns Fund Leaders are Acquitted, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 2009, at A1.
153. See Eaglesham, supra note 152; Peter J. Henning, Making Misconduct a Crime, N.Y. Times
DealBook
(June 24,
2013,
2:13 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/24/makingmismanagement-a-crime (“For all the talk about how the financial crisis must have entailed fraud,
much of the conduct during that period seemed to involve a headlong rush into risky transactions
without understanding the consequences.”); Packer, supra note 152 (“At the other extreme is the
argument that the crisis was caused simply by greed and stupidity, which remain legal under federal
law.”); see also id. (quoting U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York Preet Bharara, who
remarked that “[p]eople who did bad things . . . should get punished . . . . Doesn’t mean it’s a criminal
act. There are lots of bad people out there who I can’t charge criminally.”).
154. See Lanny Breuer: Financial Fraud, Frontline (Jan. 22, 2013, 9:42 PM) [hereinafter Breuer
Interview], available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financial-crisis/
untouchables/lanny-breuer-financial-fraud-has-not-gone-unpunished.
Breuer’s
comments
also
confirmed that the financial crisis of 2008 and ensuing recession have amplified the DOJ’s concerns
about collateral consequences.
155. See Breuer’s N.Y. City Bar Remarks, supra note 142.
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effect of an indictment on innocent employees and shareholders.”
Indeed, the “sober[ing] predictions that a company or bank might fail if we
indict” was the sort of “consideration[] . . . that literally ke[pt] [Breuer] up
157
at night.” Breuer went on to suggest that to properly discharge their
prosecutorial duties, prosecutors should consult with regulators and
experts to better understand the economic effect of bringing a criminal
158
case against a large institution.
B. HSBC: “Too Big to Jail”?
1. The Deferred Prosecution of HSBC
On December 11, 2012, a few months after Breuer delivered his
speech, Justice Department officials announced that the DOJ had
159
entered into a DPA with HSBC despite evidence that the bank had
laundered hundreds of millions in narcotics proceeds for Mexican and
Colombian cartels and facilitated transactions with entities in Cuba, Iran,
160
and other jurisdictions subject to U.S. government sanctions. The fourcount information charged HSBC with violations of the Bank Secrecy
161
Act (“BSA”), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
162
163
(“IEEPA”), and the Trading with the Enemy Act (“TWEA”).
According to the joint Statement of Facts, from 2006 to 2010, two
164
well-known Colombian and Mexican drug cartels laundered at least

156. Prosecutors, Breuer contended, have a “duty to consider whether individual employees with
no responsibility for, or knowledge of, misconduct committed by others in the same company are
going to lose their livelihood if [they] indict the corporation.” Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. DOJ’s HSBC Press Release, supra note 4. The named defendants were HSBC Holdings and
its subsidiary, HSBC Bank USA, N.A. For ease of reference, we refer to both as simply “HSBC.”
160. Id.
161. See DOJ’s HSBC Press Release, supra note 4; see also 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5332 (2012).
Congress enacted the Bank Secrecy Act in 1970 to address an increase in criminal money laundering
activity through financial institutions. See Colin Watterson, Note, More Flies with Honey: Encouraging
Formal Channel Remittances to Combat Money Laundering, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 711, 723–24 (2013). In
2001, Congress included in the USA PATRIOT Act an amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act, which
required domestic financial institutions to establish and maintain effective anti-money laundering
programs. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h). The amendment was included to “ensure that financial institutions of
all sizes implement programs to combat their vulnerabilities to those who would seek to use them to
transfer or launder illegal funds.” 147 Cong. Rec. H7129, H7204 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 2001). If the
financial institution’s failure to establish or maintain an effective anti-money-laundering program is
“willful,” it is subject to criminal penalties. See 31 U.S.C. § 5322.
162. See DOJ’s HSBC Press Release, supra note 4; see also 50 U.S.C. §§ 1702, 1705 (2012).
163. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 3, 5, 16 (2012). For a detailed discussion of the Justice Department’s charges
against HSBC, see DOJ’s HSBC Press Release, supra note 4.
164. These cartels included the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico and the Norte del Valle Cartel in
Colombia. See Statement of Facts ¶ 9, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, (No. 12-0763) (E.D.N.Y.
2013) [hereinafter HSBC Statement of Facts]; see also Robert Mazur, Op-Ed., How to Halt the
Terrorist Money Train, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 2013, at A25 (referencing a House report, which
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$881 million through HSBC without detection. HSBC’s inability to
identify this activity was due in large part to its downsized and
166
underfunded anti-money-laundering program. HSBC allegedly viewed
its anti-money-laundering program as an “area where resources could be
167
cut to increase profits,” rather than a bulwark against money laundering.
In light of these deficiencies, prosecutors charged HSBC with willfully
168
failing to maintain an effective anti-money-laundering program and
willfully failing to conduct and maintain due diligence on correspondent
169
bank accounts held on behalf of foreign persons in violation of the
170
BSA.
The Statement of Facts also alleged that HSBC violated the IEEPA
and the TWEA when, from the mid-1990s until around 2006, it knowingly
accepted hundreds of millions of dollars sourced from customers located in
Cuba, Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Burma—all of which were subject to
171
sanctions enforced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control. According
to prosecutors, HSBC went to great lengths to disguise many of the
172
transactions coming from these countries. The upshot of this was that
other U.S. banks could not properly review whether the money they
accepted from HSBC violated U.S. sanctions. Accordingly, billions of
173
dollars from these countries illegally entered the U.S. financial system.

“document[ed] the collaboration between Mexican and Colombian drug cartels and Hezbollah in narcotics
and human trafficking, smuggling and financial crimes in the United States and Latin America”).
165. HSBC Statement of Facts, supra note 164, ¶ 9. The problems were so bad at HSBC that
Mexican narcotics traffickers were “depositing hundreds of thousands of dollars in bulk U.S. currency
each day into HSBC . . . accounts.” Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶ 50, United States v. HSBC
Bank USA, (No. 12-0763) (E.D.N.Y. 2013). This easily made HSBC Mexico “the preferred financial
institution for drug cartels and money launderers.” Id. ¶ 51.
166. See HSBC Statement of Facts, supra note 164, ¶ 10(d) (describing the staffing and funding
shortages of HSBC’s anti-money laundering program). Even HSBC’s Chief Operating Officer for
Compliance found its anti-money laundering program to be “behind the times and in need of
fundamental change.” Government’s Memorandum in Support of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement
at 8, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, (No. 12-0763) (E.D.N.Y. 2013) [hereinafter Gov’t Memorandum
in Support of HSBC DPA] (internal quotation marks omitted). The degree to which HSBC’s anti-moneylaundering program was understaffed cannot be overstated. In March 2008, the bank had only four
employees to review 13,000–15,000 suspicious wire alerts generated per month. HSBC Statement of Facts,
supra note 164, ¶ 27. Today, by contrast, HSBC Bank USA has “roughly 430 employees reviewing
suspicious wire transactions.” Gov’t Memorandum in Support of HSBC DPA, supra, at 8.
167. Gov’t Memorandum in Support of HSBC DPA, supra note 166, at 7.
168. See DOJ’s HSBC Press Release, supra note 4; see also 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2012).
169. Id. § 5318(i).
170. Id. §§ 5311–5332. For a detailed discussion of the conduct underlying the charges, see HSBC
Statement of Facts, supra note 164, ¶¶ 8–28.
171. HSBC Statement of Facts, supra note 164, ¶¶ 56–60.
172. For example, HSBC Europe devised a specific procedure in the 1990s to allow sanctioned
entities to place notes in their requests or submissions of payments such that any trace of the
sanctioned entity was removed. See HSBC Statement of Facts, supra note 164, ¶¶ 65, 74.
173. See id. ¶ 71 n.6.
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Despite the seriousness of the allegations against HSBC (and its
history of noncompliance with federal anti-money-laundering laws), the
Justice Department deferred prosecution of the bank and declined to
174
pursue charges against any of its employees. At a press conference
announcing the settlement, then-Assistant Attorney General Breuer
explained that had prosecutors pursued criminal sanctions against
HSBC, it “would almost certainly have lost its banking license in the
U.S., the future of the institution would have been under threat and the
175
entire banking system would have been destabilized.” “Our goal here is
not to bring HSBC down, it’s not to cause a systemic effect on the
176
economy, it’s not for people to lose thousands of jobs,” he said. Breuer’s
remarks fueled speculation that potential collateral consequences had
177
been the dispositive factor in the DOJ’s decision not to charge HSBC.
That the Justice Department did not pursue criminal charges against
HSBC is not to say the bank was let off easily. To the contrary, the penalty
imposed on HSBC—approximately $1.9 billion—included the largest ever
178
forfeiture in a bank prosecution of $1.256 billion. The corporate
governance measures HSBC agreed to undertake were likewise expansive.
Among other changes, HSBC: (1) changed its leadership team, including
179
its CEO, general counsel, and chief compliance officer; (2) clawed back
180
bonuses paid to senior officials; (3) increased its anti-money laundering
staff from ninety-two full-time employees and twenty-five consultants to
181
880 full-time employees and 267 consultants; (4) developed a new
automated monitoring system to review every wire transaction that goes
182
through HSBC USA; (5) initiated a company-wide shift to a single
183
(6) tied senior executive
global anti-money laundering standard;
184
bonuses to the maintenance of successful compliance standards;
185
(7) separated its legal and compliance departments; and (8) required its
anti-money laundering director to report directly to the board of

174. DOJ’s HSBC Press Release, supra note 4.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Simon Johnson, “Some of These Institutions Have Become Too Large”, Baseline Scenario
(Mar. 7, 2013), http://baselinescenario.com/2013/03/07/some-of-these-institutions-have-become-too-large.
178. Gov’t Memorandum in Support of HSBC DPA, supra note 166, at 11.
179. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 165, ¶ 5(a) (“HSBC North America has a
new leadership team, including a new Chief Executive Officer, General Counsel, Chief Compliance
Officer, [Anti-Money Laundering] Director, Deputy Chief Compliance Officer and Deputy Director
of its Global Sanctions program.”).
180. Id. ¶ 5(b).
181. Id. ¶ 5(d); id. ¶ 5(c) (“In 2011, HSBC Bank USA spent $244 million on [anti-money
laundering], approximately nine times more than what it spent in 2009.” (emphasis added)).
182. Id. ¶ 5(i).
183. Id. ¶ 5(p)
184. Id. ¶ 5(v).
185. Id. ¶ 5(e).
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directors and senior management regarding its BSA and anti-money
186
In addition to the billion-dollar fine and
laundering programs.
extensive corporate governance changes, HSBC was also required to
retain an independent compliance monitor for a five year term, the first
time in the anti-money laundering context that a financial institution has
187
been required to retain an independent compliance monitor.
2. Political Backlash in the Wake of HSBC
Despite the record penalties and other punitive features of the HSBC
DPA, the DOJ’s decision to defer prosecution drew the ire of lawmakers
188
on both sides of the political divide. One group of bipartisan legislators,
led by Senator Elizabeth Warren, expressed the populist concern that
189
certain financial institutions were “too big for trial,” a continuation of
the dynamic where “[b]ig banks are getting a terrific break, and little

186. Id.
187. See id. ¶¶ 9–13; Gov’t Memorandum in Support of HSBC DPA, supra note 166, at 16. HSBC
was not the only one of the government’s corporate targets for violations of the BSA. On January 6,
2014, United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York announced that JP
Morgan Chase (“JP Morgan”) had entered into a DPA, whereby JP Morgan was charged with two
felony violations of the BSA in connection with the bank’s failure detect and report suspicious activity
undertaken by its client, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s
Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney and FBI Assistant Director-in-Charge
Announce Filing of Criminal Charges Against and Deferred Prosecution Agreement with JP Morgan
Chase Bank, N.A., in Connection with Bernard L. Madoff’s Multi-Billion Dollar Ponzi Scheme,
(Jan. 7, 2014) [hereinafter DOJ JP Morgan Press Release], available at http://www.justice.gov/
usao/nys/pressreleases/January14/JPMCDPAPR.php; see also Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
United States v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank (No. 14 CR-00007-PKC-1) (S.D.N.Y. 2014) [hereinafter JP
Morgan DPA]. The DPA, which was summarily approved by Judge P. Kevin Castel, required JP
Morgan to do the following: (1) accept responsibility for its conduct by stipulating to the accuracy of
an extensive statement of facts; (2) pay a $1.7 billion penalty to the victims of the Madoff fraud
through a parallel civil forfeiture complaint; (3) refrain from future criminal conduct and cooperate
fully with the Government; and (4) continue reforms of its BSA/Anti-Money Laundering compliance
program pursuant to previous undertakings with federal banking regulators. Id. The significance of the
JP Morgan DPA cannot be understated—JP Morgan became the first U.S. company in recent years to
enter into a DPA with the DOJ for alleged violations of the BSA. Dan Fitzpatrick, No Penalty for J.P.
Morgan Officials, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 2014, at C2. In announcing the JP Morgan DPA, United States
Attorney Preet Bharara stated, “Today, the largest financial institution in the country stands charged
with two criminal offenses. Institutions, not just individuals, have an obligation to follow the law and
to police themselves.” See DOJ JP Morgan Press Release, supra.
188. See, e.g., Letter from Senators Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) & Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) to
Attorney Gen. Eric H. Holder, Jr. (Jan. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Brown & Grassley Letter], available at
http://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/sens-brown-grassley-press-justice-departmenton-too-big-to-jail (criticizing the Justice Department for creating the perception that some Wall Street
banks are too big to jail—a “perception [that] undermines the public’s confidence in our institutions
and in the principal that the law is applied equally in all cases”).
189. Letter from Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) to Chairman Ben Bernanke, Attorney Gen.
Eric Holder, & Chairman Mary Jo White (May 14, 2013), available at http://www.warren.senate.gov/
documents/LtrtoRegulatorsre2-14-13hrg.pdf.
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banks are just getting smashed.”
Warren noted:
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Pointing to the HSBC case, Senator

If you’re caught with an ounce of cocaine, the chances are good you’re
gonna go to jail. If it happens repeatedly, you may go to jail for the rest
of your life . . . . But evidently if you launder nearly a billion dollars for
drug cartels and violate our international sanctions, your company pays
a fine and you go home and sleep in your bed at night—every single
individual associated with this. And I think that’s fundamentally
191
wrong.

In Senator Warren’s view, the Justice Department should do the same to
corporations as local prosecutors do to ordinary citizens: “squeez[e]
[them] on sometimes very thin grounds, and tak[e] them to trial in order
192
to make an example.”
A second line of criticism, voiced most prominently by Senator
Charles Grassley, focused more narrowly on whether the Justice
Department maintained a “too big to jail” policy that delegitimized the
rule of law and failed to deter corporate misconduct. According to
Senator Grassley, the “fail[ure] to prosecute individuals or banks when
they have committed crimes will result in perverse incentives and
ultimately undermine the integrity of the U.S. financial system and
193
economy.” Like Senator Warren, Senator Grassley criticized the HSBC
190. Mollie Reilly, Elizabeth Warren Takes on Eric Holder’s ‘Too Big to Jail’ Statement,
Huffington Post (Mar. 7, 2013, 8:09 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/06/elizabethwarren-eric-holder_n_2823618.html.
191. Mark Gongloff, Elizabeth Warren: Banks Get Wrist Slaps While Drug Dealers Get Jail,
Huffington Post (Mar. 7, 2013, 5:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/07/elizabethwarren-hsbc-money-laundering_n_2830166.html.
192. Cheyenne Hopkins, Elizabeth Warren Decries ‘Too-Big-for-Trial’ Approach to Banks,
Bloomberg (Feb. 14, 2013, 6:46 PM), http://go.bloomberg.com/political-capital/2013-02-14/elizabethwarren-decries-too-big-for-trial-approach-to-banks.
193. See Letter from Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) to Attorney Gen. Eric H. Holder, Jr.
(Dec. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Grassley Letter], available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/
Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1502=43551; see also Letter from Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-Or.) to
Attorney Gen. Eric Holder (Dec. 13, 2012), available at http://www.merkley.senate.gov/newsroom/
press/release/?id=42a606e4-7c45-42ed-8348-c77c508f9281 (expressing his deep concern “that the
[Justice] Department’s continuing application of deferred prosecution agreements on the grounds of
financial stability runs contrary to the intent of Congress and undermines the accountability to the rule
of law that is so fundamental to a healthy, functioning free market economy”). In a later letter to Eric
Holder, Senator Grassley and Senator Sherrod Brown expressed their joint concern regarding Lanny
Breuer’s comment that prosecutors have a duty to consult with experts to understand the economic
impact of bringing criminal charges against a financial institution. The letter: (1) quoted former
Assistant Attorney General Breuer’s remarks; (2) asked whether his comments meant that the DOJ
followed a “too big to jail” policy; and (3) questioned its apparent decision not to prosecute
corporations. See Brown & Grassley Letter, supra note 188. The senators also requested that the
Justice Department respond to the following questions:
1. Has the Justice Department designated certain institutions whose failure could jeopardize
the stability of the financial markets and are thus, “too big to jail”? If so, please name them.
2. Has the Justice Department ever failed to bring a prosecution against an institution due
to concern that their failure could jeopardize financial markets?
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DPA as “no more than a parking ticket” that “does little to discourage
future lawbreakers, and leaves the U.S. financial system highly vulnerable
194
to exploitation by drug cartels and terrorists.”
Congressional outrage reached a breaking point when, at a March 6,
2013 hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Attorney General
Eric Holder conceded that some institutions are, in fact, too big to
charge. Attorney General Holder opined that “the size of some of these
institutions becomes so large that it does become difficult . . . to
prosecute them when [prosecutors] are hit with indications that if [they]
do prosecute . . . it will have a negative impact on the national economy,
195
perhaps even the world economy.”
3. The Justice Department’s Rhetorical Shift
In the wake of the March 6 hearing the DOJ’s rhetoric began to
shift. On May 15, 2013, in testimony before the House Judiciary
Committee, Attorney General Holder took a very different stance when
he stated: “Let me be very, very, very clear . . . . Banks are not too big to
jail. If we find a bank or a financial institution that has done something
wrong, if we can prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, those cases will be
196
brought.”
This position was reinforced a few months later by then-acting
Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman who, at a House Financial
Services Committee hearing convened to address the “too big to jail”
issue, assured the committee that “[n]o institution and no individual is

3. Are there any entities the Justice Department has entered into settlements with, in which
the amount of the settlement reflected a concern that markets could be impacted by such a
settlement? If so, for which entities?
4. Please provide the names of all outside experts consulted by the Justice Department in
making prosecutorial decisions regarding financial institutions with over $1 billion in assets.
5. Please provide any compensation contracts for these individuals.
6. How did DOJ ensure that these experts provided unconflicted and unbiased advice to
DOJ?
194. See Grassley Letter, supra note 193, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
195. Mark Gongloff, Eric Holder Admits Some Banks are Just Too Big to Prosecute, Huffington
Post (Mar. 6, 2013, 6:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/06/eric-holder-banks-toobig_n_2821741.html.
196. Jason M. Breslow, Eric Holder Backtracks Remarks on “Too Big to Jail”, Frontline (May 16,
2013,
2:15 PM),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financial-crisis/
untouchables/eric-holder-backtracks-remarks-on-too-big-to-jail.
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197

immune from prosecution because of its size.” That is, “size does not
198
equal immunity.”
Then, in November 2013, at a money laundering enforcement
conference, Deputy Attorney General James Cole began his address with
the “fundamental proposition that no individual or business — including a
financial institution — is immune from prosecution . . . .” Speaking on
behalf of the Justice Department, his message was clear: “We are
committed to holding banks and their employees responsible for their
199
misconduct.” Thus, while earlier statements may have raised concerns
200
regarding the Justice Department’s motives, since that time the rhetoric
from its most senior officials has been clear and consistent: “No
201
institution should rest easy in the belief that it is too big to jail.”
Despite these assurances, key congressional leaders continued to
wonder aloud whether large financial institutions were effectively
202
permitted to avoid criminal prosecution by paying fines. Congressman
Emanuel Cleaver summarized these concerns in dramatic fashion:
“[W]hen we hear that none of the Wall Street culprits have gone to trial,
it contributes to this feeling out here that if you have money, you can get
off. If you rob a convenience store, you are going to go to jail. If you rob
203
the Nation, you just get richer, and you pay a fine.”
197. See generally Who is Too Big to Fail: Are Large Financial Institutions Immune From Federal
Prosecution? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter Who is Too Big To Fail? Hearing]; see also Sarah N. Lynch,
Justice Department Tells Lawmakers No Bank is Too Big to Jail, Reuters (May 22, 2013, 6:55 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/22/us-banks-jail-idUSBRE94L1AM20130522.
198. Raman also stressed that under the Justice Department’s corporate charging guidelines,
collateral consequences are but one factor that prosecutors are directed to consider. See Lynch, supra
note 197; see also Evan Weinberger, Top Justice Official Says No Bank Too Big to Jail, Law360
(May 22, 2013, 6:12 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/443957/top-justice-official-says-no-bank-toobig-to-jail.
199. James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., Remarks at Money Laundering Enforcement
Conference in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 18, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/
opa/dag/speeches/2013/dag-speech-131118.html.
200. See supra notes 155–158, 175–177, 195 and accompanying text.
201. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Manhattan U.S. Attorney and FBI Assistant Director-inCharge Announce Insider Trading Charges Against Four SAC Capital Management Companies and SAC
Portfolio Manager (July 25, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/July13/
SACPR.php [hereinafter DOJ SAC Press Release]; see also Jenny Strasburg & Michael Rothfeld, U.S.
Readies SAC Charges—Criminal Case Against Hedge-Fund Firm Would Follow Multiyear Insider Probe,
Wall St. J., July 23, 2013, at A1 (quoting Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District
of New York); Patricia Hurtado, JP Morgan-Madoff Case Won’t Be the Last Big One, Bharara Says,
Bloomberg (Jan. 28, 2014, 7:05 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-27/jpm-case-tied-tomadoff-not-the-last-big-case-bharara-says.html (“JPMorgan is not going to be the last big case that my
office brings in this area, I can promise that.” (quoting Preet Bahara, United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York)).
202. See id. (summarizing legislators’ concerns).
203. See Who is Too Big to Fail? Hearing, supra note 197, at 9. In an extreme expression of
dissatisfaction with the HSBC settlement, in October 2013 Congresswoman Maxine Waters, the top
Democrat on the House Financial Services Committee, introduced a bill entitled the “Holding
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IV. The “Too Big to Jail” Effect
The intense political scrutiny that culminated with the HSBC case
provides the backdrop for a phenomenon we call the “too big to jail”
effect. Specifically, two significant developments have taken place within
the government in the wake of the HSBC DPA, each of which could
substantially impact the DOJ’s approach to corporate criminality.
A. Judge Gleeson’s Opinion in UNITED STATES V. HSBC
204

The first is Judge Gleeson’s opinion in the HSBC case. On
December 20, 2012, eight days after the HSBC DPA was filed, Judge
Gleeson, the district judge to whom the case had been assigned, called the
parties in for a status conference. The purpose of the conference was not
to announce his approval of the DPA, but to ask the parties to address the
scope of a district court’s review of such an agreement. Specifically, Judge
Gleeson questioned whether Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Fed.
R. Crim. P.”) 11(c)(1)(A) and U.S. Sentencing Guideline (“U.S.S.G.”)
§ 6B1.2 governed, thereby permitting him to reject the DPA if he found
that it did not “adequately reflect[] the seriousness of the defendants’
205
offense behavior.” Judge Gleeson’s query was remarkable because no
court had ever considered this question before. Prior to this time, the

Individuals Accountable and Deterring Money Laundering Act.” Rachel Louise Ensign & Michael R.
Crittenden, New Anti-Money Laundering Bill Targets Bank Executives, Wall St. J. Risk &
Compliance J. (Oct. 23, 2014, 1:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2013/10/23/new-antimoney-laundering-bill-targets-bank-executives. Among other things, the bill includes a requirement
that the DOJ explain to Congress “‘why it did or did not pursue prison sentences’ when it settles an
anti-money laundering probe for a financial penalty.” Id.
204. See, e.g., Savarese et al., supra note 27, at 907 (“Judge Gleeson’s opinion in HSBC is the first
carefully considered judicial ruling establishing the basis for a court’s authority to review and approve
a proposed DPA.”). Before the “too big to jail” effect, both the government and corporate defendants
were right to assume that the court’s approval of a DPA was a mere formality. See Gillison, supra note
45 (providing a chart that illustrates that in the last four years, Judge Gleeson is the only district judge
to have spent more than two days reviewing the terms of a DPA involving a large bank). Even the
great weight of scholarly literature described the prospect of judicial review of a DPA as a
“pipedream.” F. Joseph Warin & Andrew S. Boutros, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: A View from
the Trenches and a Proposal for Reform, 93 Va. L. Rev. Brief 121, 122 (2007). Judge Gleeson’s
opinion was thus extraordinary by any measure. See Savarese, supra note 27, at 907 (describing
Gleeson’s opinion as both novel and important).
205. Transcript of Status Conference at 6, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., (No. 12-0763)
(E.D.N.Y. 2012). Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(A) contemplates that the DOJ and a defendant can reach a
charge bargain providing that if the defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or
a lesser related offense, “the plea agreement may specify that an attorney for the government will . . .
not bring, or will move to dismiss, other charges.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(A). U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2 is
triggered by such a plea bargain. HSBC’s Pretrial Memorandum at 2, United States v. HSBC Bank
USA (No. 12-0763) (E.D.N.Y. 2013) [hereinafter HSBC’s Pretrial Memorandum]. It provides that the
district court may accept a charge bargain provided “the court determines, for reasons stated on the
record, that the remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior
and that accepting the agreement will not undermine the statutory purposes of sentencing or the
sentencing guidelines.” 18 U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2.

1326

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:1293

uniformly-held view had been that only the Speedy Trial Act governed a
206
district court’s review of a DPA.
While at the hearing the Justice Department and HSBC expressed
207
initial agreement with Judge Gleeson’s position, their subsequent
208
written submissions presented a much different picture. In their
submissions, both parties argued that Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(A) and
U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2 were inapposite since HSBC had not agreed to plead
guilty or nolo contendere, and the DOJ had not agreed to dismiss other
209
charges in exchange for HSBC’s guilty plea. The DOJ and HSBC
contended instead that section 3161(h) of the Speedy Trial Act applied,
and that subsection (h)(2) “provides the applicable legal standard for the
Court’s review, as it requires the Court’s approval for the exclusion of
210
time.” HSBC further asserted that because “subsection (h)(2) does not
itself set forth a standard for the exclusion of time in the deferred
prosecution context,” subsection (h)(7), the Act’s catch-all provision,
211
controlled. The scope of the court’s review was therefore limited to

206. See, e.g., Zierdt & Podgor, supra note 46, at 14 (noting that DPAs are presented to a federal
court only to satisfy the Speedy Trial Act, which “exempts the deferral of criminal matters from the
speedy trial constraints”); Gibson 2013 Mid-year Update, supra note 76, at 9 (noting that the role of
courts in the DPA context traditionally has been limited to “approval of time exclusions under the
Speedy Trial Act for the length of deferral periods and dismissal of charges following successful
completion of those periods”); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-10-110, Corporate Crime:
DOJ Has Taken Steps to Better Track Its Use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements,
But Should Evaluate Effectiveness 25 (2009) (“The Speedy Trial Act allows judges to approve the
deferral of prosecution pursuant to a written agreement between the government and the defendant,
for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate its good conduct; however, the law does not
otherwise specify judicial involvement in the DPA process.”).
207. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
208. See Gov’t Memorandum in Support of HSBC DPA, supra note 166, at 2 n.1 (noting that while
“the government did not object to the Court’s characterization of the DPA as falling within the
parameters of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(A) . . . a subsequent, more careful review
of the rule and the law” shows that “the DPA does not fall within that rule” (emphasis added));
HSBC’s Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 205, at 2 (noting that Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(c)(1) is “limited by its terms to cases where the defendant pleads guilty or nolo
contendere” (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
209. See Gov’t Memorandum Support of HSBC DPA, supra note 166, at 2 n.1; HSBC’s Pretrial
Memorandum, supra note 208, at 2.
210. See Gov’t Memorandum in Support of HSBC DPA, supra note 166, at 2; see also HSBC’s
Pretrial Memorandum at 2. Pursuant to section (h)(2), “[a]ny period of delay during which the
prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the Government pursuant to written agreement with the
defendant, with the approval of the court, for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate
his good conduct shall be excluded . . . in computing time within which the trial of any such case must
commence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3616(h)(2).
211. See HSBC’s Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 205, at 2 (“While subsection (h)(2) does not
itself set forth a standard for the exclusion of time in the deferred prosecution context, subsection (h)(7),
the Act’s catch-all provision, provides that time should be excluded if the interests of justice served by the
exclusion outweigh the best interests of the defendant and the public in a speedy trial.”).
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whether the DPA was in “the best interests of the defendant and the
212
public in a speedy trial.”
Seizing on this proposed standard, the DOJ and HSBC laid out in
great detail why, in their respective views, Judge Gleeson should accept
the proposed DPA. The government’s submission emphasized two
points: (1) HSBC had implemented substantial reforms voluntarily and
213
and (2) the
“long before any charging decisions were made;”
$1.256 billion forfeiture amount imposed against HSBC was the largest
214
ever, and was not tied to the amount of money that circulated through
215
HSBC—as was the alleged money laundering activity.
For its part, HSBC focused on that fact that the old guard had been
relieved of its duties, and an entirely new U.S. senior management had
216
been appointed. HSBC noted that the bank had invested $290 million
in remediating its anti-money laundering program, which included the
217
hiring of important figures from the Treasury Department. HSBC
further highlighted the extent of its past cooperation and promise to
218
assist the government’s ongoing investigation of the case.
Despite the sensitive nature of the HSBC DPA and the potential
damage that a rejection could cause, Judge Gleeson did not immediately
approve. Indeed, he delayed expressing his approval for almost seven
219
months. The delay allowed a number of concerned citizens, including a
former HSBC employee, to submit letters seeking to persuade Judge
220
It also fueled speculation among
Gleeson to reject the DPA.
221
commentators that he would do just that.
212. See id.
213. Gov’t Memorandum in Support of HSBC DPA, supra note 166, at 11–12. These reforms, the
agency contended, eliminated the institution-wide absence of accountability that permeated the firm.
See id. at 12–14.
214. See id. at 17.
215. See id. (“The forfeiture . . . is based on the amount of drug trafficking proceeds and
sanctioned entity transactions that moved through HSBC, and not the revenue that HSBC earned
from the transactions.”); cf. Transcript of Hearing on the Joint Motion for Approval of DPA 6:12–21,
United States v. Barclays Bank PLC (No. 10-0218) (D.D.C. 2010) (criticizing the government for
requiring Barclays to pay back only what it illegally obtained).
216. See HSBC’s Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 205, at 2–3.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 4–5. Alternatively, HSBC argued that under the Due Process Clause, it is “plainly
entitled to its essential contractual right—the deferral of prosecution—because it gave up substantial
rights in reliance on the Agreement.” Id. at 5.
219. The parties filed the DPA on December 12, 2012. Judge Gleeson did not extend his approval
of the DPA until July 1, 2013. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-0763, 2013 WL
3306161 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013)
220. See Letter from Liviu Vogel to Judge John Gleeson (May 2, 2013) (on file with Author)
(requesting that the court consider whether the approval of the proposed non-prosecution agreement
should be conditioned upon HSBC’s payment of some portion of the criminal forfeiture to thousands of
victims of Iranian terrorism); Letter from Berenice Mosca to Judge John Gleeson (on file with Author)
(urging Judge Gleeson to “not approve this grossly inadequate settlement offer”); Letter from Robert
Warner to Judge John Gleeson (Mar. 18, 2013) (on file with Authors) (“Acceptance of this terrible
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Judge Gleeson finally expressed his approval of the HSBC DPA on
222
July 1, 2013. He did so, importantly, in a detailed twenty-page opinion
that bore no resemblance to the formulaic orders that had been standard
223
fare in the DPA context. Contrary to the assertions of the DOJ and
HSBC, Judge Gleeson determined that the Speedy Trial Act does not
govern a district court’s review of a DPA. Judge Gleeson opined that the
“ends-of-justice” balancing test in section 3161(h)(7) applies only in the
narrow context where the parties seek a continuance because the “the
ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the public’s
224
and defendant’s interests in a speedy trial.” But where, as here, the
parties sought to “exclude the delay occasioned by a deferred prosecution
225
the operative provision is section 3161(h)(2), which
agreement,”
provides that delay is excluded by a deferred prosecution upon acceptance
226
by the district court. The problem, Judge Gleeson observed, is that
section 3161(h)(2) “is silent as to the standard the court should employ
when evaluating whether to grant ‘approval’ to a deferred prosecution
agreement”—a question that is distinct from the whether the court should
227
“approv[e] the exclusion of delay during the deferral of prosecution.”
228
The latter question triggers only upon approval of the DPA.

agreement would permit our government to escape its responsibility and set a dangerous precedent for
American justice.”); Letter from Anonymous Individual to Judge Gleeson (on file with Authors)
(detailing compliance issues at HSBC); Letter from Marie Kerr to Judge John Gleeson (May 24, 2013)
(on file with Authors) (offering her assistance to help remediate HSBC’s compliance issues).
221. See, e.g., Matthew Mosk, Will Judge Go Rogue, Reject DOJ Settlement With Big Bank?, ABC
News (Mar. 13, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/hsbc-judge-rogue-reject-doj-settlement-bigbank/story?id=18717423 (quoting Sam Buell, who opined that “[i]t does not seem likely that the judge
would have taken this much time if he was not at least thinking hard about whether to accept the
agreement”).
222. See HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 2013 WL 3306161, at *1.
223. See, e.g., Steven E. Fagell et al., The HSBC DPA—Approved, But at What Cost?, Law360
(July 8, 2013, 3:09 PM), http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/a5ced455-cc43-40f1-80ff-52485645fabb/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/dcd98c07-67f7-4fbc-9201-58e51da1c475/
The_HSBC_DPA_Approved_But_At_What_Cost.pdf (observing that “Judge Gleeson’s opinion will
likely increase the pressure on both companies and the Justice Department to consider carefully whether
the provisions of a DPA are likely to withstand judicial scrutiny”). Judge Gleeson’s opinion was strikingly
similar to Judge Jed Rakoff’s decision in S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 329
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). See infra note 246; see also Anthony S. Barkow & Matthew D. Cipolla, Increased
Judicial Scrutiny of Deferred Prosecution Agreements, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 20, 2013, at 1, available at
http://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/12185/original/NYLJ_Barkow_Cipolla_082013.pdf?13771
17135 (observing that Judge Rakoff’s scrutiny of the Citigroup consent decree provided the backdrop
for Judge Gleeson’s decision in HSBC).
224. HSBC Bank USA, 2013 WL 3306161, at *3.
225. Id. (emphasis added).
226. See id. (explaining that the “DPA at issue here is, without a doubt, about diverting HSBC
from criminal prosecution,” thus triggering the application of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2)).
227. Id.
228. See id. (“[T]he question of whether to exclude the duration of the DPA from the speedy trial
clock hinges on a determination of whether the Court approves the DPA.”).
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To fill the void, Judge Gleeson turned to the federal court’s
supervisory power, which “permits federal courts to supervise the
229
administration of criminal justice among the parties before the bar” and
230
“protect[s] the integrity of judicial proceedings.” He opined that, by
entering into a DPA, the parties had chosen to implicate the Court in their
resolution of the matter, and by doing so “the parties [had] subjected their
231
DPA to the legitimate exercise of that court’s authority.” Judge Gleeson
conceded, however, that the invocation of a court’s supervisory power in
the context of a deferred prosecution would be atypical, and the scope of
232
the power unexplored. The more typical case is where “the defendant
raises a purported impropriety in the federal criminal proceeding and
233
seeks the court’s redress of that impropriety” —an unlikely scenario in
234
the deferral context “given the risk of derailing the deferral.” That said,
Judge Gleeson cataloged a few instances where a court would be well
235
within its supervisory power to intervene.
In the end, Judge Gleeson approved the HSBC DPA, finding no
236
impropriety that “implicates the integrity of the Court.” While he
237
acknowledged the “heavy public criticism” of the DPA, as well as the
“unsolicited input from members of the public urging [him] to reject the
DPA,” he stressed that the decision to hold HSBC criminally liable is
238
squarely in the government’s hands, not his. Judge Gleeson reasoned
that “[t]he Executive Branch alone is vested with the power to decide

229. Id. at *4 (citing United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.7 (1980).
230. Id. In 1997, Judge Gleeson published a law review article examining the scope of the supervisory
power. See generally Hon. John Gleeson, Supervising Criminal Investigations: The Proper Scope of the
Supervisory Power of Federal Judges, 5 J.L. & Pol’y 423 (1997). The article advocated that despite
pressure on district judges to rein in the all-powerful prosecutor, judges should resist the temptation to
supervise them. Id. at 428. This is because, in Judge Gleeson’s view, judges are not “well-suited to
supervise criminal investigations, a process which is generally best left to the executive branch.” Id.
231. HSBC Bank USA, 2013 WL 3306161, at *3.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. They include: (1) where the DPA requires cooperation of such nature that it may violate a
company’s attorney-client privilege or work produce protection or its employees’ constitutional rights;
(2) where the remedial actions prosecutors require the defendant to take have no nexus to the alleged
criminal wrongdoing; and (3) where an independent monitor is selected based solely on his or her
relationship to the prosecutor. See id.
236. Id. at *7.
237. Id. (citing Editorial, Too Big to Indict, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 2012, at A38; Jesse Singal, HSBC
Report Should Result in Prosecutions, Not Just Fines, Say Critics, Daily Beast (July 18, 2012),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/07/18/hsbc-report-should-result-in-prosecutions-not-justfines-say-critics.html; Matt Taibbi, Gangster Bankers: Too Big to Jail, Rolling Stone (Feb. 14, 2013,
8:00 AM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/gangster-bankers-too-big-to-jail-20130214.
238. HSBC Bank USA, 2013 WL 3306161, at *7. Judge Gleeson also acknowledged that “if the
government moved under [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 48(a) to dismiss the Information, it would be an abuse of
discretion not to grant that motion.” Id.
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239

whether or not to prosecute,” and that judges must be “mindful that
they have no business exercising [prosecutorial] discretion and, as an
240
institutional matter, are not equipped to do so.”
Nevertheless, Judge Gleeson examined the DPA provision-byprovision, noting the extent to which it requires HSBC to implement
241
remedial measures that address its systemic compliance failures. He also
highlighted the substantial amount that HSBC is required to forfeit and
242
the fact that it must admit criminal wrongdoing. Given these facts, and
the broad deference the judicial branch owes to the executive branch,
Judge Gleeson “approve[d] without hesitation both the DPA and the
243
manner in which it has been implemented thus far.” In a move equally
novel to his invocation of the federal courts’ supervisory power, however,
he maintained that so long as the criminal case remains on his docket, the
“implementation of the DPA [must] remain[] within the bounds of
244
lawfulness and respect[] the integrity of this Court.” To this end, he
required the parties to submit “quarterly reports with the Court to keep
it apprised of all significant developments in the implementation of the
245
DPA.”
Judge Gleeson’s ruling on the HSBC DPA is a radical departure
from past judicial practice. Rather than rubber-stamp the DOJ’s decision
to defer prosecution, he introduced a new standard for district courts to
246
apply in their review of a DPA’s content. But by his own admission, the

239. Id. (citation omitted).
240. Id. at *8.
241. See id. at *10.
242. Id. at *11 (“Indeed, taking into account the fact that a company cannot be imprisoned, it
appears to me that much of what might have been accomplished by a criminal conviction has been
agreed to in the DPA.”).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. The inspiration for this requirement appears to come from the Accountability in Deferred
Prosecution Act of 2009, H.R. 1947, 111th Cong. § 7, which never made it out of committee. The bill
provided that each party to a DPA as well as any independent monitor required under the DPA to
“submit to the court in which the agreement is filed quarterly reports on the progress made toward the
completion of the agreement, and describing any concern the filer has about the implementation of the
agreement.” Id. § 7(b). For a more detailed discussion of the Accountability in Deferred Prosecution
Act, see infra notes 319–322 and accompanying text.
246. Judge Gleeson is not alone in the refusal to sign off on a privately negotiated agreement
between the federal government and a big bank. He is just one among a growing group of federal
judges who have recently expressed a willingness to insert themselves into the process of reviewing
settlements with the government. The indisputable leader of this group is Judge Jed Rakoff, who in
December 2011 declined to approve a settlement reached between the SEC and Citigroup Global
Markets, Inc. (“Citigroup”), arising from Citigroup’s role in causing the collapse of the market for
mortgage-backed securities. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y.
2011). In Judge Rakoff’s view, as expressed in the opinion in Citigroup, a rubber-stamping judiciary “is
worse than mindless, it is inherently dangerous.” Id. at 335. For a more detailed discussion of Judge
Rakoff’s opinion in Citigroup, see generally Edward Wyatt, Judge Blocks Citigroup Settlement with
S.E.C., N.Y. Times (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/business/judge-rejects-sec-
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standard itself is so stringent that it is not likely to disturb any but the most
outrageous agreements. His opinion is nevertheless extraordinary in that it
opens the door for substantive judicial intervention in the deferral process.
Notably, one additional federal judge delayed approval pending a
review of the terms of a corporate DPA during the same time frame, albeit
247
without attempting to articulate an applicable legal standard. It remains
to be seen whether, going forward, district judges will provide the same
level of scrutiny or accord the same degree of deference to the Justice
248
Department. Because the law governing judicial review of DPAs is
largely unwritten, the answer is as of yet unclear.
B. The LIBOR, SAC Capital, and Credit Suisse Cases: The DOJ’s
Recent Return to Criminal Prosecutions of Financial
Institutions
While the “too big to jail” effect contemplates an open door to
meaningful judicial participation in the deferral process, it also translates
into a second significant development: a re-examination by the Justice
Department of its decade-long reliance on DPAs in the corporate
criminal context. Simply put, in the wake of the HSBC case, the DOJ
appears to have taken the intense congressional scrutiny of its charging
practices to heart, and in several recent cases federal prosecutors have
shown a willingness to embrace criminal charges as a means of
addressing corporate misconduct.
1. The LIBOR Prosecutions: The New Middle Ground?
At the same time as federal prosecutors were investigating HSBC,
wrongdoing of a different sort landed in the Justice Department’s lap.

accord-with-citi.html. Notably, the Second Circuit cast serious doubt on Judge Rakoff’s decision, finding
“no indication in the record that the court gave deference to the S.E.C.’s judgment” that the settlement
was in the public interest. See SEC v. Citigroup Capital Mkts., 673 F.3d 158, 164 (2d. Cir. 2012).
247. In United States v. Wakemed, Judge Terrance Boyle twice delayed approval of a DPA
resolving an investigation into fraudulent Medicare billing practices by Wakemed. See Transcript of
Docket Call, United States v. Wakemed, No. 5:12-0398 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 17, 2013); Transcript of
Disposition Hearing and Arraignment, United States v. Wakemed, No. 5:12-0398 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 5,
2013); see also Anthony S. Barkow and Matthew D. Cipolla, Increased Judicial Scrutiny of Deferred
Prosecution Agreements, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 20, 2013, at 2, available at http://jenner.com/system/assets/
publications/12185/original/NYLJ_Barkow_Cipolla_082013.pdf?1377117135. Boyle initially refused to
approve the DPA based on concerns about the extent of the wrongdoing, a perceived lack of
protection for privately insured patients who may have been improperly billed, and the absence of
charges against senior level managers. Id. He eventually approved the DPA after determining that it
was in the public interest. United States v. Wakemed, No. 5:12-0398, 2013 WL 501784, at *2 (E.D.N.C.
Feb. 8, 2013). In particular, Judge Boyle reasoned that a prosecution would harm the public because it
would bar Wakemed from participating as a Medicare and Medicaid provider, thus impeding patients’
access to these services. Id. Unlike Judge Gleeson, however, Judge Boyle did not seek to supply a
standard of review beyond “consider[ing] the equities at issue.” Id.
248. Fagell et al., supra note 223.
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Beginning in the spring of 2009, bank regulators were alerted to a
financial scandal orchestrated by some of the biggest banks in the world
involving LIBOR rates, the reference point for over $350 trillion in
249
financial products. At the simplest level, the allegations were that
bankers and brokers employed at the banks used to set LIBOR colluded
250
to boost profits from their in-house trading positions. The banks
involved in this alleged scandal included Barclays, Citigroup, JP Morgan
251
Chase, RBS, and UBS, among others.
Consistent with past practice, the DOJ entered into settlement
252
discussions with the targets of its investigation. Barclays was the first to
cooperate, and for its effort was offered an NPA, under which it would
253
Several months later, on
have to pay a $160 million penalty.
December 19, 2012, UBS entered into an NPA of its own, under which it
254
agreed to pay a fine of $400 million. The DOJ then entered into a DPA

249. See Christine A. Edwards et al., Implications for Commercial Organizations of the Global
Investigations into LIBOR, 129 Banking L.J. 831, 831 (2012) (stating that LIBOR is the benchmark
interest rate at which banks lend to one another, and that the products tied to it include domestic
mortgages, swaps, and futures); see also Shahien Nasiripour, Effect of Libor on US Loans Examined,
Fin. Times (July 11, 2012, 7:11 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1b2d25aa-cb66-11e1-911e00144feabdc0.html#axzz20Q1kN0xj (noting that at least 900,000 outstanding home loans indexed to
LIBOR originated during the time the rate was allegedly rigged—from 2005 to 2009).
250. The LIBOR rate is a calculation that is based upon submissions from a panel of banks
selected by the British Bankers’ Association (“BBA”). See Non-Prosecution Agreement Between the
U.S. Department of Justice and UBS AG App’x A at 1 (Dec. 18, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/1392012121911745845757.pdf. The BBA defines LIBOR as
“[t]he rate at which an individual Contributor Panel bank could borrow funds, were it to do so by
asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in reasonable market size, just prior to 11:00 [a.m.]
London Time.” Id. In connection with the rate-rigging scheme, traders at the banks implicated in the
scheme coordinated with each other to make submissions that “would benefit the traders’ trading
positions, rather than rates that complied with the definitions of LIBOR.” Id. at 8.
251. See Shahien Nasiripour, Nine More Banks Added to Libor Probe, Fin. Times (Oct. 26, 2012,
4:59 AM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6f4e7960-1f1a-11e2-be8200144feabdc0.html#axzz2dO4UORJO.
252. Patrick Jenkins & Brooke Masters, Banks Pushed for Next Libor Settlement, Fin. Times
(Oct. 28,
2012,
9:01 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/aa28764c-1f85-11e2-b27300144feabdc0.html#axzz32DD5jxYs.
253. See Liam Vaughan et al., Diamond Pays Penalty for Being First Mover in Libor Probe,
Bloomberg (July 4, 2012, 1:37 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-03/diamond-payspenalty-for-being-first-mover-in-libor-probe.html (noting that “Barclays was the first bank to
cooperate ‘in a meaningful way’” with the Justice Department); see also Press Release, Dep’t of
Justice, Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct Related to Submissions for the London Interbank
Offered Rate and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate and Agrees to Pay $160 Million Penalty (June 27,
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-crm-815.html (describing allegations
and penalties imposed).
254. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, UBS Securities Japan Co. Ltd. to Plead Guilty to Felony Wire
Fraud for Long-Running Manipulation of LIBOR Benchmark Interest Rates (Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter
UBS Press Release], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-ag-1522.html.
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with RBS on February 6, 2013, requiring RBS to, among other things,
255
pay $150 million.
In an extreme departure from past practice, however, the DOJ
followed the settlements with UBS and RBS by filing criminal charges
against the Japanese subsidiaries of those banks for their roles in the
256
LIBOR-rigging scheme. On December 19, 2012, and February 6, 2013,
the same days the DOJ disclosed its respective settlements with the
parent companies, it announced that it had secured guilty pleas from
UBS Securities Japan Co., Ltd. (“UBS Japan”) and RBS Securities
Japan Limited (“RBS Japan”), respectively, for coordinating with one
257
another to manipulate LIBOR rates in their favor. UBS Japan agreed
258
to pay a $100 million fine in connection with its guilty plea; RBS Japan
259
agreed to pay $50 million. Then-Assistant Attorney General Breuer
heralded the pleas as “extraordinary results” involving “significant
260
financial institutions.” “Our message is clear,” he added, “no financial
261
institution is above the law.”
The UBS Japan and RBS Japan guilty pleas are landmark
262
developments. Not since Drexel Burnham more than twenty years prior
had the Justice Department filed criminal charges against an arm of a
263
major a financial institution. Some commentators speculated that the
DOJ used the UBS Japan and RBS Japan prosecutions as test cases for a
264
new model of corporate criminal prosecutions. The UBS and RBS

255. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶ 7, United States v. Royal Bank of Scotland PLC,
(No. 3:13-CR-74-MPS) (D. Conn. 2013).
256. See generally Plea Agreement, United States v. UBS Secs. Japan Co., Ltd. (No. 3:12-cr-00268RNC) (D. Conn. 2012), [hereinafter UBS Plea Agreement]; Plea Agreement, United States v. RBS
Secs. Japan Ltd. (No. 3:13-CR-73-MPS) (D. Conn. 2013) [hereinafter RBS Plea Agreement]. Some
commentators have opined that this strategy of settling criminal charges with the parent company
while securing a guilty plea from one of its subsidiaries is not entirely new for the Justice Department.
See Garcia et al., supra note 96 (observing that the Justice Department has pursued this “middle”
strategy in a few FCPA enforcement actions).
257. See UBS Press Release, supra note 254; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, RBS Securities Japan
Limited Agrees to Plead Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of Libor Benchmark
Interest
Rates
(Feb. 6,
2013)
[hereinafter
RBS
Press
Release],
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/February/13-crm-161.html.
258. See UBS Plea Agreement, supra note 256, ¶ 15.
259. See RBS Plea Agreement, supra note 256, ¶ 15.
260. RBS Press Release, supra note 257.
261. Id.
262. See Peter J. Henning, UBS Settlement Minimizes Impact of Guilty Plea, N.Y. Times DealBook
(Dec. 20, 2012, 1:54 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/ubs-settlement-minimizes-impact-ofguilty-plea (“[T]he guilty plea by the UBS subsidiary is the first time an arm of [a] major financial
institution has been convicted of a crime since Drexel Burnham was more than 20 years ago.”).
263. Id.
264. See Richard Levick, The LIBOR Scandal: Prosecutors Have a New Plan, Forbes (Feb. 28, 2013,
7:22 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardlevick/2013/02/28/the-libor-scandal-prosecutors-have-anew-plan (“While LIBOR-type cases have been the focus so far, there are expectations that a successful
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subsidiaries reportedly had “few ties to American arms of the banks,
265
containing any threat to the [U.S.] economy.” By focusing charges on
non-U.S. subsidiaries, therefore, the DOJ could “shield the parent
company from losing its license, but still send a warning to the financial
266
This middle-ground approach reduced the risk of an
industry.”
Andersen-style collapse while still capturing the expressive function of a
267
criminal conviction. As then-Assistant Attorney General Breuer made
268
clear, the goal was “not to destroy a major financial institution,” but to
send a strong message that criminal wrongdoing would be dealt with a
heavy hand.
In any event, the UBS Japan and RBS Japan prosecutions were the
first signal that the Justice Department’s approach to corporate criminal
prosecutions was evolving, and that for the first time in many years,
criminal charges against a high-profile financial institution were back on
269
the table.
2. SAC Capital Advisors: Controlled Criminal Prosecution
To the extent that the UBS Japan and RBS Japan cases reflect the
Justice Department’s willingness to pursue a middle-ground approach to
corporate criminal prosecutions, the indictment of SAC Capital Advisors
270
demonstrated that the DOJ was prepared to go all the way as well.
On July 25, 2013, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern
District of New York announced the indictment of SAC Capital and
three affiliates—investment managers responsible for managing the
portfolio of a group of affiliated hedge funds—for engaging in a
“[d]ecade-[l]ong [i]nsider [t]rading [s]cheme on a [s]cale [w]ithout
271
[k]nown [p]recedent in the [h]edge [f]und [i]ndustry.” The indictment,
beta test involving purported rate manipulation by UBS and Royal Bank of Scotland—as well as ongoing
inquiries regarding Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase—will lead to broader application in the future.”).
265. Ben Protess, Prosecutors, Shifting Strategy, Build New Wall Street Cases, N.Y. Times
DealBook (Feb. 18, 2013, 10:00 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/prosecutors-build-abetter-strategy-to-go-after-wall-street. In addition, in both instances, DOJ officials reportedly received
assurance from Japanese regulators that a corporate conviction would not amount to a loss of license.
See Levick, supra note 264 (“The fact that a Japanese regulator reassured UBS ahead of time that its
subsidiary would not lose its license is widely cited as an example of the essential frailty of this new
regime.”).
266. Garcia et al., supra note 96.
267. See id.
268. Jim Puzzanghera, U.S. Says UBS Was Motivated by “Sheer Greed” in Libor Rigging, L.A.
Times (Dec. 19, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/19/business/la-fi-mo-ubs-libor-fine-justice20121219.
269. See Garcia et al., supra note 96 (“[I]f the UBS and RBS subsidiaries weather prosecution
without significant harm, the DOJ may well pursue this approach on a wider scale.”).
270. See id. (describing the Justice Department’s deferred prosecution of the parent entity while
securing guilty pleas from a subsidiary as a “middle way” approach).
271. See DOJ SAC Press Release, supra note 201; see also Sealed Indictment, United States v. S.A.C.
Capital Advisors, L.P. (No. 13 Crim. 541) (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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the product of an extensive investigation of the venerable firm, alleged
that from 1999 through at least 2010, numerous SAC Capital portfolio
managers and research analysts obtained and traded on material, nonpublic information, or recommended trades based on such information to
273
SAC Capital’s owner, Steven Cohen. The “systematic insider trading”
that took place was allegedly “the predictable and foreseeable result” of an
institutional failure at SAC Capital, namely a business culture that
encouraged the “relentless pursuit of an information ‘edge’” with “no
meaningful commitment to ensuring that such ‘edge’ came from legitimate
274
research and not Inside Information.” The scheme purportedly netted
275
SAC Capital and Cohen “hundreds of millions of dollars” in profits.
Despite the indictment, there remained the possibility that
prosecutors and SAC Capital would enter into a DPA, allowing SAC
Capital to escape without the stain of a criminal conviction. In a departure
from post-Andersen practice, however, prosecutors instead demanded a
276
guilty plea. In November 2013, SAC Capital pleaded guilty to four
277
counts of insider trading and one count of wire fraud. The firm also
278
agreed to both pay $1.8 billion in penalties—a record sum —and
terminate its investment advisory business, thus closing the fund to
279
outside investors.
272. See DOJ SAC Press Release, supra note 201.
273. See id. ¶ 4. At the time of the indictment, SAC Capital had close to $14 billion under
management; a little more than half of which came directly from Steven Cohen. See Gretchen
Morgenson, How to Gauge SAC on the Richter Scale, N.Y. Times (July 27, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/business/how-to-gauge-sac-on-the-richter-scale.html
(discussing
various factors regarding whether S.A.C. Capital will be able to survive the indictment).
274. See Sealed Indictment, supra note 271, ¶ 7. As charged in the indictment, the institutional
failure manifested in three ways: (1) a focus on recruiting portfolio managers and analysts who had
proven networks of public company contacts, with little corresponding effort to ensure that such
contacts were not exploited to obtain inside information; (2) a system of providing financial rewards to
employees for recommending to SAC Capital’s principal “high conviction” trading ideas that had an
“edge” over other investors; and (3) limited compliance measures designed to detect or prevent
insider trading. See David Deitch, The Problems with the SAC Capital Indictment, Law360 (July 26,
2013, 12:14 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/460326/the-problems-with-the-sac-capital-indictment;
see also DOJ SAC Press Release, supra note 201; Sealed Indictment, supra note 271, ¶ 11.
275. See Sealed Indictment, supra note 271, ¶ 7.
276. See Michael Rothfeld, SAC Will Plead Guilty to Insider-Trading—Hedge-Fund Firm to Pay
Biggest Fine in U.S.’s Prosecution of Financial Crimes, Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 2013, at C1 (describing the
SAC Capital prosecution as “a turning point for criminal prosecution of corporations”).
277. See Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P. (No. 13 Cr. 541
(LTS)) (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
278. See id. at 2; see also DOJ’s SAC Capital Press Release, supra note 19 (describing the penalty
imposed as “the largest insider trading penalty in history”). The $1.8 billion penalty consisted of a
$900 million in connection with the criminal case and the forfeiture of $900 million in connection with
the settlement of the civil forfeiture action filed against SAC Capital. Id.
279. See Plea Agreement, supra note 277, at 2. Critics contend that the charges against SAC
Capital were an inappropriate proxy for the government’s inability to marshal sufficient evidence
against Cohen himself. See Deitch, supra note 274 (observing that because the prosecutors were
unable to collect sufficient evidence to prosecute Cohen, it “is obvious . . . that the government’s
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The charges against SAC Capital represented an even more
significant deviation from the norm than the LIBOR cases discussed
above. Rather than extracting guilty pleas from foreign subsidiaries as
part of a negotiated settlement, as it did with UBS and RBS, the DOJ
indicted and obtained the criminal conviction of a well-known U.S.
280
investment advisory firm. This marked the first occasion when the
government resorted to such an extreme tactic in the corporate criminal
281
context since the Arthur Andersen case more than ten years ago. It was
282
thus a bold step by any measure.
decision to indict the SAC Companies is a proxy for charges against Cohen”); Katherine Rautenberg,
Attorneys React to SAC Capital Indictment, Law360 (July 25, 2013, 6:29 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/460233/attorneys-react-to-sac-capital-indictment (quoting Glen Donath, who opined that
“[t]he government rarely decides to charge a company and not its owner or CEO”). That is, the Justice
Department’s fallback strategy should not have been to destroy Cohen’s firm because the evidence
against him was weak. See Deitch, supra note 274 (“Having failed to develop evidence to support a
criminal case to send Steven Cohen to prison, the government is instead seeking to destroy the
company he has built.”); Rautenberg, supra (“It is remarkable that federal prosecutors would indict
SAC without enough evidence to bring serious charges against Steven Cohen . . . . This indictment will
effectively sink SAC, devastating the lives and investment portfolios of countless innocent
individuals.”); id. (“Given the somewhat unique circumstances of this case and its very high public
profile, this decision to indict the company . . . . should be seen more as an effort to save face after the
[government’s] inability to develop the evidence necessary to indict Mr. Cohen despite years of
sustained efforts to do so.”). Others suggest that there is nothing improper about the government’s
case against SAC Capital, as it is a relatively straightforward application of the “collective knowledge”
doctrine, which imputes to an organization the collective knowledge of individual employees. See, e.g.,
id. (describing the relative ease of filing charges against SAC under the collective knowledge doctrine
of corporate criminal liability). This indeed appears to be the DOJ’s theory, as the indictment focuses
in significant part on the conduct of eight current or former employees—all of whom have been
charged and convicted of insider trading. Nate Raymond, SAC Capital’s Martoma Found Guilty of
Insider Trading, Reuters (Feb. 6, 2014, 6:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/06/us-sacmartoma-idUSBREA131TL20140206 (observing that the conviction of former SAC Capital employee
Mathew Martoma was the eighth conviction of a current or former SAC Capital employee).
280. Mark Gongloff, SAC Capital Indictment Does Not Mean the End of “Too Big to Jail”,
Huffington Post (July 25, 2013, 6:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/25/sac-capitalindictment-too-big-to-jail_n_3652646.html (noting that the government has taken an “unusually
tough” stance against SAC).
281. See Rautenberg, supra note 279 (quoting Stanley A. Twardy Jr., who observed that “[t]he
indictment of SAC is the first significant federal criminal prosecution of an American company since
the Government charged Arthur Andersen, which caused the demise of Arthur Andersen”).
282. Julie Creswell, A Relentless Prosecutor’s Crowning Case, N.Y. Times DealBook (July 25,
2013,
8:24 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/a-relentless-prosecutors-crowning-case/
?ref=preetbharara&_r=0 (describing the SAC indictment as “a rare and bold step by the government”). Less
than a month after the announcement of SAC Capital’s guilty plea, it was reported that JP Morgan
was nearing a settlement with the Justice Department and various federal regulators for the bank’s
alleged role in facilitating the massive Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Bernard Madoff. Jessica SilverGreenberg & Ben Protess, Criminal Action is Expected for JP Morgan in Madoff Case, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 12, 2013, at A1. On January 7, 2014, the DOJ announced that it had entered into a DPA with JP
Morgan pursuant to which the bank would consent to pay $1.7 billion in penalties. Press Release, U.S.
Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York, Manhattan U.S. Attorney and FBI Assistant Directorin-Charge Announce Filing of Criminal Charges Against And Deferred Prosecution Agreement With JP
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., In Connection With Bernard L. Madoff’s Multi-Billion Dollar Ponzi Scheme
(Jan. 7, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/January14/JPMCDPAPR.php. JP
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At the same time, the decision to indict SAC Capital might not be
seen as a dramatic shift from prior practice. Because the bulk of SAC
Capital’s assets under management belonged to Steven Cohen, and
because the firm had only about 1000 employees, SAC Capital’s demise
did not appear to present the sort of collateral risk that prosecutors had
283
In fact, many commentators have
historically sought to avoid.
questioned whether, after a lengthy investigation focusing on Steven
Cohen’s role in a pervasive criminal scheme, putting the firm out of
284
business was the DOJ’s precise objective.
When viewed in conjunction with the LIBOR cases, then, the
Justice Department’s approach to SAC Capital could be viewed as a
controlled exercise that continued to maintain a healthy degree of
respect for the Andersen effect.
3. Credit Suisse: The Beginning of the End of Modern DPAs?
To the extent that the LIBOR and SAC Capital cases raise any
doubts about the DOJ’s abiding preoccupation with the Andersen effect,
recent developments have put those doubts to rest. In both words and
deeds, the DOJ appears to be undergoing a generational shift in
mindset—one in which the threat of collateral consequences may be
285
overstated.
In March 2014, in remarks before a gathering of securities industry
legal and compliance professionals, Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, repudiated the notion of federal

Morgan also agreed to pay an additional $1 billion to federal regulators for its alleged programmatic
violations of the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”). Id. Notably, before determining to enter into a DPA
with JP Morgan, the DOJ reportedly considered demanding that the bank plead guilty to a criminal
violation of the BSA. Silver-Greenberg & Protess, supra, at A1.
283. See Morgenson, supra note 273 (“SAC’s $14 billion under management is not enough to pose
a risk to the financial system.”); Gongloff, supra note 280 (“SAC Capital is hardly the test case for
whether the government will indict a big, important financial firm.”). While opinions may differ as to
whether SAC Capital case represented a permanent shift in the DOJ’s approach to corporate
criminality, it is clear that the government did not entirely abandon its concern about the collateral
consequences of such prosecutions. To ensure that SAC Capital would continue operating during the
pendency of the proceedings against it, the DOJ agreed to the imposition of a protective order permitting
SAC to continue to do business. Patricia Hurtado, SAC Judge Lets Firm Keep Operating While Facing
Charges, Bloomberg Businessweek (Aug. 10, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-08-09/sacallowed-by-judge-to-keep-operating-while-facing-charges-1.
284. By all indications, the Justice Department succeeded. On August 28, 2013, it was reported
that SAC Capital lost its last outside investor. See Jenny Strasburg, SAC Loses One of Its Most Loyal
Investors, Wall St. J. MoneyBeat (Aug. 28, 2013, 4:05 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/08/
28/sac-loses-one-of-its-most-loyal-investors/tab/print. In March 2014, SAC Capital announced that it
had changed its name to Point72 and would operate as a family office. SAC Capital, Meet Point72
Asset Management, N.Y. Times DealBook (Apr. 7, 2014, 12:24 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/04/07/sac-capital-meet-point72-asset-management.
285. Kara Scannell, Shift in Tactics pays off for DOJ, Fin. Times, May 20, 2014, at 16 (noting that “Credit
Suisse’s guilty plea reflects a dramatic evolution in thinking within the DOJ under [Eric] Holder”).
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prosecutors maintaining a “too big to jail” charging policy in perhaps the
most forceful terms to date. “No one,” he maintained, “should receive a
286
get-out-of-jail-free card based on size.” In Bharara’s view, “after Arthur
Andersen, the pendulum has swung too far and needs to swing back a
287
bit.” Bharara went on to offer his own perspective on the issue of
collateral consequences:
Companies, especially financial institutions . . . have a natural and
powerful incentive to make prosecutors believe that death or dire
consequences await on the other side of such an action . . . . I have
heard assertions made with great force and passion that if we take any
criminal action, the skies will darken; the oceans will rise; the nuclear
winter will be upon us; and the world as we know it will end . . . . What
I have found typically is that, in reality, as we suspected, the sky does
not fall . . . . And so, this repeated Chicken Little routine . . . begins to
wear thin. And the result is that we view with more and more
skepticism . . . all the breathless claims of catastrophic consequences
288
made by companies large and small.

Having thus down played concerns regarding the Andersen effect,
Bharara predicted that “before too long a significant financial institution
will be charged with a felony or be made to plead guilty to a felony,
289
where the conduct warrants it.”
Less than two months later, on May 19, 2014, the Justice
Department announced that Credit Suisse Group AG (“Credit Suisse”),
the parent company of the Swiss-based global bank, pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to aid and assist U.S. taxpayers in filing false income tax
290
returns with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). According to the
plea agreement, Credit Suisse employed a variety of methods to assist
U.S. clients in concealing their undeclared accounts, including: assisting
clients in using sham entities as beneficial owners; destroying account

286. Press Speech, SIFMA’s Compliance and Legal Society Annual Seminar: Prepared Remarks
of U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara (Mar. 31, 2014), http/www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressspeeches/
2014/SIFMARemarks2014.php [hereinafter Bharara SIFMA Remarks].
287. See id.
288. See id. (“They predict that the stigma and reputational damage from any criminal action—even a
deferred prosecution—will be too much to bear: the stock price will plummet; clients will vanish; customers
will flee; key employees will quit; and senior executives will be so ashamed to be associated with a criminal
resolution that they themselves may have to consider whether they can even stay on as leaders.”).
289. Id. Bharara expressed the view that perhaps the “greatest existential threat” to a corporation
came not from the prosecutor, but from “the regulator who has the power to revoke a charter.” Id.
“[B]anking regulators with whom the revocation decision ultimately rests,” he observed, “are often loathe
to commit to a decision before or even at the same time as the prosecutor.” Id. If the regulator does not
rule out the possibility of a charter revocation, “then prosecutors must continue to consider that as a
possibility.” Id. Because “not all corporate criminal misconduct is deserving of a death sentence,”
moreover, “prosecutors cannot be as aggressive as perhaps they should be.” Id. Bharara opined that
prosecutors and regulators should work in concert so as to avoid creating “a gaping liability loophole that
blameworthy companies are only too willing to exploit.” Id. He noted that this dynamic was “changing for
the better,” and predicted that there would be “proof of that in the future.” Id.
290. See Credit Suisse Press Release, supra note 20.
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records sent to the United States for client review; and structuring funds
291
transfers to avoid transaction reporting requirements. Credit Suisse
admitted to having operated an illegal cross-border banking business
that assisted thousands of U.S. clients in opening and maintaining
offshore bank accounts in a manner designed to conceal their assets and
292
income from the IRS. Credit Suisse also agreed to pay approximately
293
$2.6 billion in fines to the DOJ and other federal and state regulators.
The importance of the Credit Suisse case cannot be overstated. It
marks the first time a financial institution of this size has pleaded guilty
294
to criminal charges since 1989. After more than a decade of heavy
reliance on DPAs as the preferred approach to addressing corporate
criminal conduct, the DOJ now appears ready to challenge the basic
assumption underlying such reliance: that DPAs are an effective hedge
against the collateral consequences of corporate prosecutions. The
Credit Suisse case confirms that the Andersen effect, once of paramount
concern, may be of dubious certainty and severity in the minds of federal
prosecutors.
The question then arises whether the Credit Suisse case marks the
beginning of a new era of corporate charging practice, one in which the
modern DPA assumes a less prominent role.

V. Conclusion: In Defense of Deferred Prosecutions, Subject to
a New Standard of Judicial Review
The collapse of Arthur Andersen prompted a wave of scrutiny of
the Justice Department’s corporate charging approach, and the eventual
adoption of deferred prosecutions as the preferred measure to address
295
corporate misconduct. More than a decade later, the financial crisis of
2008 and ensuing economic downturn have triggered a new wave of
296
scrutiny, this time of the DOJ’s reliance on DPAs. The scrutiny reached
its peak when the DOJ entered into a DPA with HSBC despite evidence
of egregious misconduct on HSBC’s part, causing key legislators and other
critics to question whether the DOJ has maintained a de facto “too big to
297
jail” policy with respect to major financial institutions. Since May 2013,
298
the DOJ has consistently denied that such a policy exists.

291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Credit Suisse Pleads Guilty in Tex Evasion Case,
N.Y. Times DealBook (May 19, 2014, 4:50 PM), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/19/
credit-suisse-set-to-plead-guilty-in-tax-evasion-case/?emc=edit_na_20140519&nlid=52411902.
295. See supra notes 78–93 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 94–125 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 196–201, 286–289 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 196–201, 286–289 and accompanying text.
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Supporters and detractors of the Justice Department alike would
agree that the new wave of scrutiny has coincided with two interesting
developments within the judicial and executive branches of the
government. The first, as reflected in Judge Gleeson’s opinion in
connection with the review of the HSBC DPA, is a willingness of at least
one federal district court to assume a more central role in the review of
299
deferred prosecutions. The second, as evidenced by the LIBOR, SAC
Capital, and Credit Suisse cases, is an emerging willingness on the part of
the DOJ to pursue criminal charges over DPAs against corporations,
300
including financial institutions. Both can be considered to have a
301
substantial impact on future DOJ charging practices.
A. In Defense of Deferred Prosecutions
The Justice Department’s recent efforts to secure criminal convictions
302
from high-profile corporate defendants is concerning. The potential for a
large, viable firm to be annihilated by the filing of criminal charges should
303
be avoided at all costs. Moreover, when the target of such charges is a
major financial institution, the potential damage to the broader United
States’—or even the global—economy counsels in favor of prosecutorial
304
restraint. That no corporations have collapsed after entering into DPAs
with the government since the Andersen case is a clear indication that
the DOJ’s decade-long charging policy has been effective, and should not
be disturbed.
Despite the potential harm that a criminal conviction can visit on a
corporation, there is a growing sentiment in the Justice Department that
the risk of another Andersen-style collapse is illusory, and that historical
305
concerns were overblown. U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara has been the
299. See infra Part V.A.
300. See infra Part V.B.
301. See infra Part V.B.
302. Commentators have criticized Congress for taking the same reactive approach when passing
criminal justice legislation to respond to dramatic instances of white-collar criminality. For example,
“[i]n the aftermath of the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, Congress passed the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989. Likewise, following the Enron debacle,
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed by Congress.” Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Crime and the
Recession: Was the Chicken or Egg First?, 200 U. Chi. Legal F. 205, 213–14 (2010). According to
Podgor, “[t]he reactive model typically used after a crisis provides immediacy to solving the problem,
but it often does not educate for comprehensively solving future legal issues.” Id. at 216.
303. See, e.g., supra notes 79–93 and accompanying text (examining conditions that led to Arthur
Andersen’s demise).
304. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 Geo. L.J. 193, 198 (2008) (describing systemic risk
as the risk “that a trigger event, such as an economic shock or institutional failure, causes a chain of
bad economic consequences—sometimes referred to as a domino effect”).
305. In a recent article, for example, Gabriel Markoff provided empirical evidence demonstrating
that of the fifty-four public companies convicted from 2001 to 2010, only five “suffered fates that could
reasonably be described as business failures.” Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the
Corporate Death Penalty: Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. Pa. J.
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leading voice articulating this new view, diminishing the “breathless claims
306
of catastrophic consequences made by companies large and small.” The
DOJ’s willingness to abandon ten years of calamity-free experience to
pursue criminal charges against a succession of high-profile corporate
defendants suggests that more prosecutions of financial institutions may
be on the horizon. Indeed, as of this writing media reports indicate that
the DOJ is seeking to extract a guilty plea from the parent company of
BNP Paribas, and a fine as high as $5 billion, to resolve an investigation
307
into extensive scheme to violate government sanctions.
For the Justice Department, the solution is not to jettison DPAs in
favor of ramped-up corporate prosecutions; DPAs have consistently
proven to be an effective way to minimize the risk of the Andersen
effect, while allowing the DOJ to achieve most of its desired remedies.
The filing of criminal charges and a statement of facts permit the
government to send a strong public message regarding the type of conduct
308
that it will not tolerate. The large fines that typically accompany DPAs
are an effective method for exacting punishment and making
309
By mandating extensive reforms, monitoring ongoing
restitution.
performance, and threatening prosecution in the event of compliance
310
deficiencies, DPAs modify future corporate behavior.
The lone concern regarding the use of DPAs in the corporate crime
context is the unfettered discretion the Justice Department has enjoyed
311
to negotiate their terms. The incentive to avoid criminal prosecution at

Bus. L. 797, 823 (2013). Of these five failures, he noted, none “could reasonably be said to have
suffered a business failure because of their convictions.” Id. From this, Markoff argues, “[t]here is no
empirical evidence to support the existence of the Andersen Effect.” Id. at 830. The suggestion that
Markoff’s empirical findings debunk the notion that indictment is tantamount to the corporate death
penalty is off the mark. For one thing, only two of the fifty-four convictions Markoff cited were for
offenses involving fraud. See id. at 821. In addition, not one involved a financial institution. See id.
Markoff himself concedes that his study supports only the narrow conclusion that where an
organizational defendant is prosecuted for a crime that does not involve its core business model, the
risk of the Andersen effect is not as prevalent. See id. at 832–34.
306. See Bharara SIFMA Remarks, supra note 286; see also Michelle Jones, Preet Bharara at the
DealBook Conference, ValueWalk (Nov. 12, 2013, 11:28 AM), http://www.valuewalk.com/2013/11/
preet-bharara-at-the-dealbook-conference (quoting an interview in which Bharara stated that the
collateral consequences argument is “overstate[d],” and that “accountability matters,“ even when a
financial institution is involved).
307. Maya Nikolaeva & Matthias Blamont, BNP Paribas Warns U.S. Sanctions Fine Could Exceed
Provision, Reuters (May 14, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/14/us-bnp-paribas-agmidUSBREA4D0HL20140514; Christopher Matthews, Noeme Bisserbe, & Andrew Grossman, Why
U.S. Is Pushing for Guilty in BNP Sanctions Probe, Wall St. J. (May 9, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052702303701304579551792387975638; Yalman Onaran & Greg Farrell,
BNP Paribas Risks $5 Billion Fine, Customer Flight, Bloomberg (May 21, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-21/bnp-paribas-risks-5-billion-fine-customer-flight.html.
308. See supra notes 139, 142 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 140, 142 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 141–142 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 127–136 and accompanying text.
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all costs essentially vests all power in the hands of federal prosecutors, who
have developed the practice of structuring arrangements that provide for a
312
potentially excessive degree of intrusion into a corporation’s operations.
Absent some kind of check, therefore, the clear benefits of deferred
313
prosecution can be eclipsed by the potential for prosecutorial excess.
B. A New Standard of Judicial Review of DPAs
For the better part of the last decade, district judges have assumed a
314
sidelines role in corporate criminal prosecutions. As Judge Gleeson
observed, the Speedy Trial Act describes only the effect of a court’s
approval of a DPA; it does not serve as a guide for judges’ exercise of
315
their discretion. District judges generally appear on the scene only after
the DPA is a fait accompli, and then provide automatic approval to terms
dictated by the government.
The new standard of judicial review of DPAs that Judge Gleeson
proposed in the HSBC case is a welcome development. Judicial
intervention can serve as a vital safeguard against prosecutorial abuse of
316
the sort that has been associated with modern DPAs. It can also
provide a measure of independent assurance that the terms of settlement
are not unduly lenient. At a minimum, a more prominent judicial role
may provide more legitimacy and transparency to the process.
Judge Gleeson’s reference to a federal court’s supervisory power
falls short of the optimal standard, however. Courts generally invoke
317
their supervisory power only upon a defendant’s urging. In other
words, it would be odd for a district judge to intervene on a corporate
defendant’s behalf if the DPA reflects a bargained-for exchange, and
does not, as Judge Gleeson described, “transgress[] the bounds of
318
lawfulness or propriety.”
To fill the void, Congress should amend the Speedy Trial Act to
provide a clear framework for judicial review and approval of DPAs. A
promising starting point for this discussion is a proposal originally
considered by Congress back in 2009. The Accountability in Deferred
Prosecution Act (“ADPA”) was intended to “promote uniformity and to

312. See supra notes 133–236 and accompanying text.
313. See Koehler, supra note 133, at 997 (finding that prosecutors occupy positions of “advocate,
judge, and rulemaker,” and “induce settlement through the ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ they possess even
though many of the enforcement theories leading to these resolutions are untested and dubious”).
314. See Gillison, supra note 45.
315. See United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-0763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
July 1, 2013).
316. See supra Part II.A.
317. “In the typical supervisory power case, the defendant raises a purported impropriety in the
federal criminal proceeding and seeks the court’s redress of that impropriety.” HSBC Bank USA,
N.A., 2013 WL 3306161, at *6 (citation omitted).
318. Id.
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assist prosecutors and organizations as they negotiate and implement
319
ADPA directed the Attorney
deferred prosecution agreements.”
General to “issue public written guidelines for deferred prosecution
320
agreements and non-prosecution agreements.” ADPA also provided
that approval of a DPA should issue only “if the court determines the
agreement is consistent with the guidelines for such agreements and is in
321
the interests of justice.” ADPA further ensured judicial review on the
back end of the process, providing that “[t]he court shall, on motion of
any party or the independent monitor if there is one, review the
implementation or termination of the agreement, and take any
appropriate action, to assure that the implementation or termination is
322
consistent with the interests of justice.”
Congress would be well advised to complete the work it began in
2009 by enacting the ADPA. To empower district judges to engage in a
meaningful review of the terms of corporate DPAs, however, a
revitalized version of the Act should also include a prescriptive roadmap
for the inquiry a court must undertake to ascertain whether a proposed
323
DPA is “in the interests of justice.” As a condition of granting approval
of a DPA, the court should be required to consider, and render findings
of fact with respect to whether the terms of the DPA are fair and
reasonable in relation to the acknowledged corporate misconduct. To
support this review, the court should specifically address the following
issues:

319. H.R. 1947 § 4(a), 111th Cong. (2009). The ADPA was never voted out of committee, and
therefore was never enacted.
320. Id. § 7(a).
321. Id.
322. Id. § 7(c). Recently, lawmakers in the United Kingdom introduced DPAs to their corporate
crime enforcement regime via the Crime and Courts Bill, which received Royal Assent on April 25, 2013,
and became the Crime and Courts Act 2013. See Crime and Courts Act, 2013, c. 22, sch. 1–25 (Eng.). The
central contribution of the Crime and Courts Act is its introduction of DPAs to the UK. Id. § 1, sch. 17
(defining DPA). In contrast to the use of deferred prosecution in the United States, the act authorizes
prosecutors to enter into DPAs only with corporations, partnerships, and unincorporated associations,
not with individuals. Id. § 4(1)–(3). The Act provides that after prosecutors and the corporate entity
begin their negotiations, but before the parties agree to the terms of the DPA, “the prosecutor must
apply to the Crown Court for a declaration that entering into a DPA with [the corporate entity] is in
the interests of justice, and the proposed terms of the DPA are fair, reasonable and proportionate.” Id.
§ 7(1). Only upon the Crown Court’s declaration that the DPA meets both standards does the DPA
become effective. Id. § 8(3). Whether the Crown Court extends or withholds approval, it “must give
reasons for its decision on whether or not to make a declaration.” Id. § 7(2). If the Court withholds its
approval, it can do so in private. But if it approves the DPA “it must do so, and give its reasons, in
open court.” Id. § 8(6). For a detailed discussion of the UK deferred prosecution process, see Speech,
Oliver Heald, Solicitor Gen., The Mechanics of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in the U.K.
(June 26, 2013) (transcript published June 28, 2013), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/
speeches/the-mechanics-of-deferred-prosecution-agreements-in-the-uk.
323. H.R. 1947 § 7.
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(1) Whether the admitted facts prove each element of the alleged
324
criminal violation ;
(2) The legal precedent supporting the DOJ’s interpretation of the
relevant criminal statute;
(3) Whether the corporate defendant has a history of similar
misconduct;
(4) Whether the individuals whose acts contributed to the alleged
misconduct have been prosecuted for the wrongdoing attributed to the
corporation;
(5) Whether the proposed fine against the corporate defendant is
sufficient to achieve the objectives of punishment and restitution;
(6) Whether the governance measures the corporate defendant is
required to undertake are the least intrusive to promote deterrence
and rehabilitation; and
(7) Whether the prosecutor and corporate defendant’s fear of
collateral consequences is well-founded.

A standard of review of this sort would ensure that judges are
actively engaged in reviewing proposed deferred prosecutions. The
requirement to delineate the Justice Department’s legal analysis and
precedential foundation would therefore provide transparency regarding
the DOJ’s interpretation of key provisions and would address concerns
regarding potential prosecutorial overreaching. Examination of the
corporate defendant’s admitted misconduct and any prior history of
similar offenses, the extent to which individuals have been prosecuted,
and the propriety of the proposed fine and governance measures would
provide greater assurance that a DPA is not granted based exclusively on
a perception that a corporate defendant is “too big to jail.” The process
of rendering findings of fact with respect to all of these issues would
provide a clear record confirming that the terms of the DPA were
325
evaluated and deemed reasonable in light of all the relevant factors.
In short, the standard of review contemplated herein would capture
the benefits of deferred prosecutions while avoiding the pitfalls that have
accompanied their use historically.

324. See Pete J. Georgis, Settling with Your Hands Tied: Why Judicial Intervention Is Needed to Curb
an Expanding Interpretation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 42 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 243, 277
(2012) (arguing for a process of judicial review of DPAs and NPAs “in which a federal court should
demand detailed information as to how the admitted facts violate the specific provisions of the [FCPA]”).
325. The benefits of this approach were astutely summarized by Judge Frank Easterbrook:
“Explanation produces intellectual discipline; a judge who sets down in writing (or articulates in court)
the methods pro and con, and his method of reaching a decision, must work through the factors before
deciding, and we then may be sure that his decision is based on appropriate considerations even if not
necessarily one we would have reached ourselves.” Horn v. Transcon Lines, Inc., 898 F.2d 589, 592
(7th Cir. 1990).

